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These texts belong neither to philosophy nor to poetry—and 
yet they are for the most part focused on a substantial area of 
overlap between these two venerable disciplines, vis-à-vis the 
question, “What is it like to be X?” Philosophers like to fill in 
the X with something exotic like a bat or a dolphin, or even an 
Artificial Intelligence, while poets tend to fill it with some-
thing else, equally exotic, namely themselves. For the diffident 
and introspective author of A Rushed Quality and Bodying 
Forth, the X, while definitely human, is perhaps someone in 
general, equally distant from and equally intimate with both 
the writer and the reader in the very moment of their epony-
mous activity.  
 It is often observed that things come into focus for a brief 
time during the transition between two epochs of a life, whe-
ther individual or collective. Once the new dispensation is es-
tablished, one looks back with a certain nostalgia at that 
strangely shimmering lucidity encountered on the hinge. All 
that might remain, as in this case, is a series of snapshots with 
a clear enough sequence, but no real beginning or end. Of the 
transition here, we can only say that it concerned a different 
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feeling about embodiment and about time, and that these 
were quite ordinary effects of the accumulation of lived days.  
 The start of it all was the perception of what was called the 
“rushed quality,” as something persistent and bothersome and 
of which there was no question of its ever being shed. Rather 
than evaded or denied, it was welcomed because it seemed for 
the first time since childhood to mark a structural occurrence 
presenting a new metaphysical datum. 
 As it happened, this quality proved very elusive in its 
mature bothersomeness and the inquiry into it soon turned 
into a sort of quasi-theoretical fascination, which took as its 
main theme the fate of pure subjectivity—the utterly unfunc-
tional, utterly useless, utterly dispensible feeling of being. The 
rushed quality is perhaps merely the sense of it draining away, 
or its long-sustained decrescendo. In this it has proven to be 
more than a merely personal accident, but a cultural indicator 
as well, pointing in the direction of a number of striking 
developments—a sort of technological enframing of subjec-
tivity, its willing assimilation into massive networks, the 
giving over of metaphysical subjectivity to quasi-scientific dis-
courses, and the concomitant explosion of ethical subjectivity 
—all facts that the author of these pieces was not yet in a 
position to confirm, indeed not even to ask himself how Walt 
Whitman’s “Song of Myself” might read in the age of the 
“selfie.” 
 But the self is also an extraordinary power of recuperation, 
of rising again and again from its own ashes, and this power 
was very much in view, and especially in relation to its two 
main antagonists, one of which was named heteronomy, and 
the other unnamed, which we might now call syncope. These 
correspond roughly to the psychological and the neurological 
unconscious. 
 On the other hand the two texts presented here, whose 
composition was separated by a substantial period of time, 
can be seen as two phases of movement with respect to this 
initiating quality, an in-breathing and an out-breathing.  
 There are a number of ideas that run through many of the 
pieces, motivating beliefs of the writer, such as the inex-
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haustability and ungraspability of the moment, the existence 
of a direct connection to reality which is betrayed in every 
attempt to formulate it, and a skepticism about the bad infin-
ities latent in the natural attitude. And of course there is a 
continued dialogue with various more or less identifiable 
thinkers and positions. But again, this is not philosophy, the 
arguments are virtual, and the stakes are something entirely 
different. 
 Each of these pieces emerged in a renewed relation to the 
blank page. It is hoped that for the reader, apart from any 
resonances they may set in motion, they retain some of the 
qualities of silence, expectation and impossibility that gave 
birth to them. 
David Odell, 2015

A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
abc

This rushed quality to life may continue on now, 
accelerating until the final fall into death. Imagine 
there was one more chance to step back and take a look 
at it all. An utterly personal investigation, unhindered 
by the projections and expectations of others. 
1 
2 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Words are from this mind. The personal tone is chosen 
but not necessary, and doubtless only of limited 
adequacy. There are many beliefs making up this 
mind, or the associated person—how they will per-
form, what they will do, what the value of their ges-
tures is estimated to be. 
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Moments when it can speak, can express the limits of 
its meager understanding, are rare and brief. “It would 
be good to stop time, to reach into the timeless un-
derpinning of one moment, right down into the gene-
rative core so that all future moments could be 
justified.” That is what it thinks, but when it acknow-
ledges it to be impossible it shrinks back and gives over 
to appetites and its own phantoms of desire.  
3 
4 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Many different voices and stagings arise here, or they 
seem to, because there is always a sense of confusion 
about where this line of thought should go, and what 
should follow it. As if I am being tested against reality, 
and not any sort of big reality—just this personal, 
small, one life of a reality, this inexhaustible and banal 
here and now. 
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Subtract away vanities of the mind, the heart, and the 
spirit, even vanities of the body, and what is left over? 
Who or what could still speak in that final and first 
place? I, he, it, the mind, the speaking: all equally inad-
equate. 
5 
6 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
There is no way to measure these vanities, but even 
here the speaking is guarded and hesitant, half stifled. 
At other times there were abundances, and how good it 
felt to unburden myself of these. Even if I were alone 
there was the sense that speaking this could do some-
thing for someone. What I call vanity is the memory of 
past beliefs. 
6 
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So, I’ll be walking down the street and the con-
traction—the sense of looking at the world through a 
jerky pinhole, and of great physiological cycles in the 
body that cut each thread of thought so short—will be 
upon me, almost unbearable. And yet I’ll know that 
I’m knowing this, whatever that may mean, and that 
somehow if this separable awareness was speaking it-
self then all would be redeemed. 
7 
8 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Knowing even the failure to know, in this failed know-
er. The emptiest of all categories, and yet I seem to 
have lived only for that. 
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That words, that knowing, that some inner act could 
make a difference: this is what seems to be demanded, 
yet you know that this could not be so. How can I 
reach you and touch you once and for all, how speak 






































To put this impossibility before me each day, to 
pray to it before I go to bed at night and to kiss it 
each morning; the metabolism doesn’t allow it. Once 







































Here, with a sickening abundance, are all those 
moody images from my solitary life. The little hab-
itual perceptions that are not registered as habits. 
Myself in my life, in the bodies of my ancestors, 
doing this human thing, day after day. Evocative 
snapshots, at least so conceived. But if I find any-




































To distill the essence of this melancholy con-
sciousness, because it seems that this distillate is an 
object that would always be alive. Many times I’ve 
looked at this from the outside and seen it as a form 
of trickery, a knotted promise with no substance. 
And now from inside it, that demystifying gaze 




































From a formal point of view, it has certainly been 
distilled many times before: to all intents and 
purposes, the same subjectivity shimmering nacre-
ous on the page. On countless other pages. That, of 
course, is precisely the spur here: to do it again, yet 
differently. The same reflexes, the same complex 
moves, back and forth, the shuttle stroke, in order 
that the reading stand at a point equidistant from 


































The romantic consciousness, the self in time, the 
glancing flash of liveliness: that sheer energy that 
would shatter all restraints, that speaks itself in the 
poetical word, and transforms the speaker to at 
least the limits of humanity. And then the inun-
dation and exhaustion of this movement, in every 
conceivable way. Like a fire spreading into every 
line of tinder, in every conceivable way. And then 
new and seemingly inexhaustible, energyless echoes 

































A text is an operator of consciousness, and im-
plicitly I assert that I am its fixed-point. A con-
traction operator, as irony can be here understood, 







































Is there any such thing as consciousness? It is a 
word that simultaneously makes certain things pos-








































The understanding that “this, here”—Dasein—is a 
consciousness knowing itself through knowing 
what is not itself, seems to be one of the big 
contexts. Perhaps there is just one other, viz. “From 
the beginning, not a thing is.” The former, how-
ever, does not depend on the auxiliary concepts of a 
self, or of doership. There is a certain independence 
from what passes, even if it is passive, and a quest-
ing through “experience,” passing through, for 

































The dimensions of the questioning engendered by 
these paragraphs, the readerly, the writerly: each of 
these is of course plural. The former taking place, 
say, in a rapid and not particularly sympathetic 
perusal, and as such forming a part of the back-
ground for the writerly, which includes both the 
days and weeks of composition, filled with other 
things, and the intervals when there is the exper-
ience of unformed sentences, of reaching out over 
gaps, the living of this. The mysterious presence 
































It can appear that a life is questioning here, and to 
put it this way merely invokes a number of special 
reflective spaces and metaphors. It could have 
appeared as something quite certain, yet what is 
actually present is an uncertainty, looking to attach 
itself to the facticity of handy cues. So, call it a life 
or a consciousness, or a history, a psyche, or even 



































Such inquiries would be merely academic were 
it not for the fact that the experient of life, the 
passenger, under whatever guise it falls, has this 
theoretic core. When you look at all that is 
known or hypothesized in its bearing on this 
present moment, there is a vast overlapping 
contextual structure, and by theoretic injections 
one may find oneself located in any part of it, as 
virtually that part itself. It is a weak sense of 

































Chasing this phantom passenger as far as possible 
out of idealistic redoubts, it arrives at the edge of an 
abyss. The theoretic nature of the subject shelters a 
demand, and when this demand is apprehended 
nakedly at the limit of theory, one finds it pecul-
iarly un-shy of the abyss. The demand is not 
theoretic. How can this be? How can there be a 
question beyond the possibility of the concepts that 
could formulate it? How can there be another 
knowing, ungraspable in any theoretic net? The 
answer is laughably simple when the question is 































What kind of event is this, here, now? A moment 
of embodied consciousness, an instant of a life, of 
its unfolding, a tiny pebble in the history of the 
universe. None of these. All of these. There is some- 






































Accept that there is nothing in the phenomena 
immediate to this apprehension of the question and 
of its difficulty that indicates the answer, or even 
whether the question is meaningfully posed. The 
thought mechanisms, we are told, were designed 
for something else. Yet all of that is grist to the mill. 
Our aim is precisely to make strange; the strange-



































If there were some kind of disembodied con-
tinuation of life after death, an astral plane or 
some such space, then would we sleep and 
dream there? Presumably not, since there would 
not be the physical body or brain to be fatigued. 
And so the kind of self we would experience 
would have little in common with what we 
know now. Similarly with any other physically 
bound aspect of life. The kind of life lived there 
would have so little to do with this one that it 
































This elusive awareness—can it be thought in any 
way apart from some subtle concept of an appre-
hension of the whole, or the pure potential of such 
an apprehension? All such concepts are seen to be 
founded on typical illusions, continuities whose 
field of operation is exclusively belief. If there were, 
in fact, continuity, we would not recognize our-
selves. The alternative is pure and systematic nega-
tion, but what passes for this is (generally?) only an 

































There is something salutary and ethically 
stimulating in taking in the evidence of the 
discontinuity and heteronomy of the ideal sub-
jective realm, the working correlative of “the 
self.” Is it that this complex idea is structurally, 
but non-logically, a function of its own nega-
tion? That would make it a sort of “self” within 
the “self,” amongst other infinite regresses. So, 
there may be a sort of sublime and virtual Sub-
ject of the entire sceptical, scientific explan-
atory enterprise. It is theory and the self is 































Primacy of awareness, or this virtual and tran-
scendental Subject, or Truth as an act, an unveiling, 
a recognition, a lifting of the forgetting: how this 
idea pops up again and again in various guises, 
even after it was thought to have been dismissed. It 
does not much differ from a correspondence theory 
of truth—that a pure receptivity can conform itself 
to the simply seen, which seems to be necessary to 
ground the enterprise of wanting to know, even if 
this enterprise is “seen” to be futile. Taken purely as 
a functioning, the enterprise in which “truth” is a 
token (amongst others) is in no position to demand 
anything, much less correspondence to something. 
It proceeds as long as the thinking has not yet 




























If there were correspondence as a central function, 
then we would be more able to be sympathetic with 
each other. Learning would be easier, not so de-
pendent on experiencing for oneself; it would be 
possible to convey the sense. As it is, our efforts in 





































There is an underlying question here which I have 
been thinking about for more than 20 years, when I 
have been able to do so, but it is difficult to 
formulate explicitly. Is the atom of consciousness 
homologous (in any way) to the “natural” con-
sciousness as theorised from everyday experience 
(folk psychology?), or is it radically strange and not 
like “consciousness” at all? “Atom of conscious-
ness” being understood in the least question-beg-


































When it is written out like this, the question seems 
a crazy one. For whom could this possibly be an 
issue? Which experient could embrace both poles 
with sufficient detachment? But perhaps this quest-
ion veils yet another, even less easy to formulate 
and possibly even more crazy, since it is segregated 
from criticism, or even clear scrutiny. Such a ques-
tion has the potential to give rise to numerous 
commentaries, and somehow we expect these to 
articulate with the concerns of others, but perhaps 
we are each so isolated within the field of our own 
obsession that we readily hallucinate such artic-
ulations. All of which would be an example, of 
course, of the very strangeness that the question 




























The medium scale of experience: this means the 
here and now but with acceptance of all working 
abstractions that are at hand. Does it exist at all? 
Perhaps it only seems to in retrospect. In any event, 
it seems to know itself, irritably, as incomplete, as 
lacking any solid grounding and therefore unable 
to rely on its own constructions from one moment 
to the next. The micro- or atomic scale is when this 
question of a ground is attempted to be ferreted 
out, and the macro- or historical scale is where the 
































Rightly pursued, commentary on the phenome-
nological core of the experient can bring about in-
teresting changes in the reading consciousness.  It 
suggests that the Being of this event, whose para-
meters are otherwise quite unknown, can be at 
issue. In a positive sense, this Being names the pure 
space of potentials differentially activated “here,” 
the operator whose selective eigenvalues are all that 
is known. The positive sense must always lead to 
error, to mistaking the species for the genus. That 
Being is at issue cannot be taken in any light way. 
As a reality, it cannot be any sort of special event; it 






























There is a far more elusive side to this event, at least 
for this writer—to speak from within the emotional 
representations as they arise without falling into 
any of the errors of over- or under-credulousness. 
Sometimes the speaker is outlined against the 
sunset or dawn, his hand raised in some rhetorical 
gesture, but the more reliable manifestation is this 
shrinking away into apparent emptiness, this dis-
ingenuous sense that of course there is nothing 

































The responsible self is the one in time, acting, re-
sponding, measuring in time. But what is this 
famous time? It is all too easy to slip away from in 
this writing since the words do not belong to the 
same temporality. What medium sustains the 





































Of course, it might be possible to wake up from this 
remembered life and see that it was only a dream 
after all. The only evidence that it could be other-
wise is the vividness of the present, and this fails 
entirely. It is quite possible to imagine a super-
present against which this one, known as the in-
variant reality of “life,” would seem quite thin and 
shadowy. That is because the present is a sort of 
project for being, and without presuming that it 
could ever be completed, one can imagine it at a far 
more advanced stage. If one extends this imagi-
nation and tries to include the metaphysical shell 
that it carries, snail-like, as we carry some version 
of Kant’s categories, it seems that it could be in-




























The “la vida es sueño” is culturally overdetermined. 
It may express an incapacity to live or a satiety with 
life. It may be suspended in the heat of action, but 
it is always a possibility once that action is com-






































Big metaphors for life, such as “a journey” or “a 
dream,” may be meaningless in themselves since 
there is no reference point outside of life from 
which to expose them, but they have a different use 
in that they raise the very question of such a ref-
erence point. More than that, they seem to awaken 
a knowledge that just such a viewpoint has always 
existed. This “seeming” is a very interesting one, 
since it may point to the paradoxical logic of the 
concept of life as a sort of self-referential concept—
that is, intentionally self-referential but extension-
ally not so. Or else, it may indeed point to a ground-
ing awareness, an ineffable and radically present 





























Life is like a dream, because in calling it “life” we 
admit that it is already a story, something told, or, 
in the telling, already an adventure in inter-
pretation. There is a sense that however spon-
taneously it is lived, life is erected upon a broad 
flow of happening, such as cannot be named prior 
to experience, yet that out of which experience is 
sculpted. Contemplating this, the idea arises that 
there is no flow, no time, no space in this pure 
underlying happening. Again, how does this idea 
arise? Is it the paradoxical logic of quasi-self-
reference which generates such a strange topology, 
or does the topology point to something implicitly 
known, like one of those sensory figures,	   or ho-
munculi, where the body parts are shown in 
proportion to the size of their mapping in the sen-


























While I cannot say that I am the body, I also cannot 
say that I am not the body. The apparent knowing 
of the latter is an artifact. Part of the “I” function in 
ordinary awareness is “I am not the object”; it is the 
way the mechanism works. Thus, by successively 
enumerating the parts of the body, one may verify 
in turn that the virtual subject is other than the 
composite virtual body—that is, the body as pos-
ited by thought, language, imagination etc. This 
proves nothing at all. If the real body were absent 
































Strange figure of speech: “my life,” and its 
variants. Not quite the same as “in my ex-
perience,” since the former implies the totality 
and the one for whom there is this totality. At 
what point in the development of reflexive 
language does it become necessary to incorpor-
ate the concept, implicitly or explicitly uttered, 




































Is this related to the possibility of saying, “life is a 
dream”? It seems that there are many other lo-
calities of meaning in the living of “a life” which 
have equal or greater authority as implicit judge-
ments to “life is like a dream”—usually in the midst 
of some passionate activity, when it is not an ex-
plicit reflection but a fullness of living that tem-
porarily resolves the doubt about whether this is yet 
“life,” a doubt which one didn’t know one had until 

































The idea of transfinite concepts: just as the 
mathematics of the simplest physical move-
ments, or of more complex but unremarkable 
ones like riding a bicycle, are immensely 
complex if explicitly developed, so it is with the 
structure of naturally inhabited concepts.	   It is 
not to be assumed that just because they are 



































It is only on certain occasions that there arises the 
desire to adequately speak the moment, yet it seems 
at those times that this is the truest desire. That 
imperious phenomenology is what proves it is 
desire, just as does the reflection that the adequacy 
that haunts it has never been and can never be 
achieved. It is a phantasmatic filling up, with mean-
ing this time. And yet, the speaking happens—all 


































A thought is a representation without intrinsic 
ground. That is, it is a picture without any 
assurance that the context that makes that 
picture possible is an ultimate one in relation to 
the apparent contents. The absence of intrinsic 
ground is what makes it possible for thought to 
be usefully local, as well as to chain together in 
diverse and unpredictable patterns. This very 
thought is itself a perfect example of what it 
describes. But why is it that there should even 
































To be aware that one is thinking is itself just 
another thought, and yet there must be an irre-
ducible moment of acknowledgment for it to be 
possible. It is unclear whether this is a logical con-
clusion, or some other kind. What can be said of 
that moment of acknowledgement? It can’t itself be 
represented, yet it is “experiential,” even if it cannot 
be framed as an experience. Understanding that 
this is an essential but necessarily overlooked as-
pect of “experience” implies a vastly different glob-
































Any kind of attention brings about a structured 
phenomenology, not just in the objective phase 
but also, by a strange implicitness, in the sub-
jective phase as well (even though, by defini-
tion, the subjective phase is invisible in any 
single act of attention). This seems quite re-
markable, because it suggests that even the 
barest attention is already theoretically struct-
ured to seem like just that. Attention is just an 
idea, and if it weren’t so suspect, we might be 
tempted to say that both the subject and the 
object in any act of consciousness are objects to 






























What of that “strange implicitness”? In know-
ing X, through sheer attention and compres-
ence, my organ of knowing is felt to be myself. I 
am available, wherever needed, to fill the vista 
opening out by whatever of X is revealing. I am 
this availability to know correlative to X’s avail-
ability to be known. And what was meant by 
“myself” just now? As soon as the idea comes of 
this knowing of X, a frame forms around it, and 
I am outside this frame. X reveals only one 
more of my accidents, and in this sudden alien-
ation I seem to know myself more fully, but 
negatively. X is now seen again as the essential 
catalyst of this moment, non-separate from its 
unity. This works as dialectics, but does it do as 



























Dialectics, in the broadest sense, speaks of 
homologous structures found in many localities 
of experience, many different enframings. Some 
of these frames are harder to abstract than 
others, so it seems that awareness of the homo-
logies may be of assistance in doing so. There 
may be a mathesis for translating a lived un-
derstanding from one region of experience to 
another, from a clearly delimited frame to one 

































The nodal points of a dialectic, as understood in 
this way, are terms such as self and other, 
subject and object, awareness, horizon, ground, 
etc.: all the terms in the broad family of phe-
nomenology. Again, awareness of the homolo-
gies—as between, say, a movie or a poem and 
one’s own self-understanding—suggests a dia-
lectic of dialectics; it is not that the structural 
patterns are the same, but that what is deep and 
unspeakable is that which seems to glimpse its 
face in these fleeting reflections. The glimpsing 
and the seeming, these are equally terms of a 






























It is difficult to observe the transition from sleeping 
to waking; the dreams seem to become more fre-
netic, and the first superventions of the awareness 
of day are merged in with them, with the failure of 
the dreaming mind to be able to maintain its 
dream, let alone give it some sort of conclusion. 
The first waking moments are fuzzy with a bland 
acceptance, and consciousness reclaims the body 
without any sense of an other to make some meta-
physical contrast. The dream melts away from this 
































What is the right question to ask about direct 
experience? Not, “Show me direct experience,” and 
not “Is there direct experience?” The first presumes 
absurdly that it can be indicated, the second that it 
has being. “Does experience presuppose an event 
that neither is nor is not experience?” is perhaps 
better. There is almost a logic that demands a 
positive answer to this question—that is, not a 
logic, but a persistent mirage of a logic. Of direct 
experience we must also affirm that, in so far as it 
may be spoken of, at no moment is it unknown.  
The question then arises, “What kind of event is the 






























Life is a dream: meaning not that it is thin and 
illusory like a dream, but that it is thick and 
overdetermined, that events unfold unpredictably 
and yet with an uncanny and insistent pertinence 
and a strange dream-like solipsism. The press of 
overdetermination produces a kind of wandering 
development with sudden state-changes, which in 
turn produce the illusion of illusion. You are a 
character in my dream as I am in yours, so where 
do we meet? Or should I say that that we do meet is 
































When I write the word “here,” it can refer to the 
space of this writing as it is being brought forth, or 
it can refer to this life, this space of experiencing 
and referencing. In each case the word gives 
consistency to something that would otherwise 
seem more uncertain in its unity and possibly opa-
que to any reference. It has to do with the 
continuity of thought, the thought that makes this 
utterance, being itself a discontinuous phenom-
enon. In the latter case, the fact that it has a 
beginning and an end gives a unity to subjective 































As in set theory, it is impossible to comprehend the 
universal class, although it can be implied by an 
appeal to mere being, which is perhaps no more 
than a verbal indication. The facts of a beginning 
and an end, birth and death, go beyond this cor-
respondence, since they delimit the most universal 
frame—what I call the first world. Here, what is 
meant by birth and death are, however, not the 
same as the empirical events occurring in historical 
time. Their certainty does not derive from the over-
whelming weight of precedent; it is encountered in 
the very core of the search for understanding. It is 






























What is the topology of awakening? It is not the 
dreamed character that awakens, clearly, but it is 
also not the dreamer, since the two functions of 
dreaming and awakening are incompatible. It some-
times seems as if dreaming is nothing but a con-
tinual failed awakening, so that the dreamer is the 
failed awakener. To be in the state of waking up is 
to be in a certain situation which is in its own way 
as dramatic and insistent as the dream, but there is 
something wonderful in the transient awareness of 
two worlds, roughly similar in nature (spatial, em-
bodied, locally narrativised, etc.), but of such non-
compossible reality. This is only a transient aware-





























I called it failed awakening because it seems as if 
the objects that most persistently draw attention 
and even desire are somehow projections of the 
whole space, and thus pointers to the way out of it. 
They necessarily fail to lead one out because, how-
ever well they point, they are still in the space of the 
dream. Even the dialectic of such objects is itself 
such an object. This is only a certain way of seeing 


































The first world is not an experienced world, nor is 
it just the logically presupposed reality behind any 
world-experience. It is nonetheless a world, and 
that is why it is intimate with this ontological fin-
iteness, insusceptible to proof. The first world stays 
the same when local worlds, when all completed 
meanings, supervene on each other. There is no 
meaning and no subject in it; it is what is not 
constituted in any way, but all constitutions pre-
suppose it. No matter what happens or fails to hap-
pen, we never leave the first world. This knowing, 
freed in all its parameters, all its suppositions, all its 
knowingnesses, returns to the first world as a 





























Yet there is no one at home in this firstness. There 
is no one also to say what became of the one. The 
one is never superceded, and yet it has vanished. 
The one is with others in a meeting that abandons 
phenomenology and its logics. So perhaps it could 





































Knowing finds its only fulfilment in the first 
world, but there is no knowing there because 
there is no knower. The starkest kind of differ-
encing, without any point from which to make 






































This mapping of the first world does not belong 
to the first world. It belongs, perhaps, to the 
mapping world, and by the very same gesture, 
by the very same maps, it gives rise to the many 






































It seems easy to show that we can never get hold of 
reality. All the mechanisms available for any such a 
getting hold are always limited in scope, and reality 
is independent of scale. For example, the concept 
or the word, which are fine as functioning on an 
immediate scale but absurd on the scale of, say, the 
“world.” Mathematical and scientific techniques 
seem far more successful, but even they only func-
tion in carefully delimited contexts. Why is there 

































The urge itself and the activities it gives rise 
to—which from a certain broad perspective are 
a large part of what we do—can seem deluded, 
yet it is precisely this revulsion from known 
delusion that drives us back to it. To see that all 
positions are false is itself a position about 
positions that we take to be true. Perhaps there 
is only this negative knowing, but then we seek 


































I am walking along the street, my eyes are taking in 
the scene, understanding is rapidly processing 
everything that momentarily fills my attention. It is 
very lively; it is what is happening. It is human 
consciousness and so it only assumes its reality in 
the space of all active human consciousness, in this 
moment. This space is inconceivable: not just the 
number of humans and the plurality of visions—
even to know one other is too much. As a specific 
human consciousness, everything positive, every 
specific difference potentially experiencable, falls 
into this immense totality. To be in relation to this 
totality (which is radically unknowable in positive 
terms) is the same as what it is to be aware in this 
moment, that implicit ekstasis. To be aware is pre-
cisely what is not awareness of any content(s), but 


























The whole precedes the parts, and it is the 
implicit reflection of the whole in the part that 
makes the part possible as part. The parts form 
an explicit reflection of the whole, as their 
object, but limited by perspective. The parts dis-
agree as to content but agree about those as-
pects of their reality (the categories) that follow 
from its perspectival nature. It is this that they 
call reality, and it forms the basis of the ele-
ments which they assemble in order to gain a 
































These thoughts are like the bubbles in my lava 
lamp: slow-moving, short-lived, sequentially re-
peating with indefinite variation, and dimly reflect-
ing each other on their opalescent surfaces. From 
the top of the column of water to where the bubbles 
rise filled with heat, there is rarely any merging. 
They have an identity, a skin, and they gently jostle 
against each other to gain the highest point before 
they cool and redescend. At the bottom, there is 
always a mother pool that swells and gives birth to 
endless fresh bubbles. They rise and the pool is 
depleted until old bubbles return and merge with it. 
This moment of merging is marked by a tiny 
shock-wave that travels over the now continuous 
surface. Alternatively, when a rising bubble sep-
arates from the mother pool, it stretches and thins 
the neck between them. The elongated neck breaks 
in two places and a small perfectly spherical bubble 
























Something seen becomes a metaphor for the 
system of the seeing. How did it arise that there 
is a one who demands this knowing? Desire 
goes out but fails to fulfill itself and so it turns 
back to merge again in its source. But it is 
deflected on the way back, since it cannot 
retrace its steps exactly, and so instead it adopts 
the source, via a reflection, as its new object. 
The nature of desire is to be mercurial, ever 
changing and adapting, and also to be of a 
strange dual nature, both pure phenomenon 
and latent structure, so no matter how oblique 
the motive embodied, it always seems trans-





























The “I” fails to be an I, therefore it is an I. Or, the 
subject fails to be a subject, therefore it is a subject. 
Or, self-reflection fails to reflect itself, therefore it is 
self-reflection. There are a few ways in which this 
might be understood. It could be that the failure 
itself is the negative medium in which there is 
enough formal self-reflection to underwrite the 
pure project of a subject, or an I, or whatever. Or it 
could be that nothing on the level of the I or of any 
other performance (in thought) could, or even 
needs, to guarantee the subject. These are masks 
through which the reality manifests, and it is 
precisely their failure that makes them able to 
function as masks. That which they present can be 
presented in no other way, so they are “it” at the 



























It is strange that post-phenomenological philo-
sophy has so much currency. Perhaps it is 
strange about any philosophy, but here, these 
ways of declaring the pre-conceptual nature of 
what happens seem to be dredged up from a 
very particular and personal contemplative 
space, yet are instantly recognised by the reader 
as his own, even if the language is quite opaque. 
One’s own most intimate thoughts are found to 
have been anticipated by some professional philo-
sopher somewhere, and then shortly afterwards 
they have filtered into art, and then are every-
where taken for granted. But post-phenom-
enology is also a game. We know the landscape 
very well, but who can penetrate deepest into 
the cave with a syntax and grammar thought to 


























This, here, ineluctably recognised as a kind of 
suffering, but for which the words won’t come. 
How to speak of this very poverty of spirit? 
There is a kind of condemnation that does not 
want to admit this state or anything about it, 
and it, the condemnation, has free reign it 
seems. It is extremely personalised, it contains 
the very pseudo-essence of privacy, and yet one 


































This willful suffering, then, has something in it 
of the quixotic desire for uniqueness. This de-
sire is incoherent and groundless (almost like, 
but in other ways quite opposite to, the desire 
for truth; what family of motivations does that 
freak of nature spring from?), yet preserves it-
self from that knowledge by a general clouding 
up of the mind. One cannot be unique in know-
ledge anyway; the closer affinity is with pain, 

































How does it come about that there is an ex-
periencing of suffering? On what medium has it 
grown? It is as though the screen of experience can 
tilt through various angles in space-time. When it 
has a tilt relative to the time axis, then there seems 
to be a flowing, a working out in time. Any grasp-
ing of the predicament so revealed entails an entire 
mechanism that sustains that tilt. This is a buried 
history of mistaken living that forms the implicit 
preconditions for the ongoing story: the parameters 
that maintain the frame. Everything, including 
every mode of self-understanding that falls within 
the frame, partakes of the same essence of be-
coming. Even the constitutive differences in temp-




























At the end of a cycle, the voice that sustains this 
writing faded and was lost in the background noise. 
On looking back, it is seen that the thoughts do not 
repeat themselves as exactly as was expected. It was 
rather the insistence on haste that meant that it was 
impossible to follow up most of the pathways of 
inquiry that fleetingly opened. The tracks do not go 
through a wood, but an urban kaleidoscope. But it 
is often difficult to face what comes directly in my 
path. At the conclusion, the cycle faded on the un-
































This seems to be a spontaneous reporting, a simple 
telling, and yet it is known also as a rare phys-
iological achievement. When conditions are right, 
when there is a certain permission, then time can 
be folded back to make the vantage point which is 
spoken for. I mean to say that everything that is 
said about “life” is uttered or read by an agent of 
such a precariously achieved system, it is a function 
of operations quite heterogenous to its internal 
self-understanding. It surfaces from the mute pur-
posiveness of organic life, for example, and what it 
“sees” is coloured almost entirely by the clash of its 
discursive pre-conditions and its “real” conditions. 
Real is parenthesised because it is not knowable if it 
can even be indicated in this way. Discursively, 
there is only an indicial space in which such opera-


























To see psychic or spiritual life as some sort of 
function of reality, so that it arises with no 
essential connection out of the extended void. It 
pursues its intrinsic development in oblique 
relation to this real, growing in internal com-
plexity through mastering the hazards and con-
tradictions necessarily engendered by its own 
progress. It feeds on energies and organised 
differences that come from outside itself, but 
which do not have to undergo any change in 
nature to nourish it, since it always already 
assumes them to be of its own substance. Not 
interpretation, but pure “pretation.” Eventually 
these sources of difference dry up and this auto-
nomous life-understanding goes on a long jour-
ney of decline back to the original void. This 
paradigm is the familiar evolutionary perspec-
tive. Here we see that it arises naturally out of 
the concept of “function,” since this in turn 
implies beginning and ending, maximum and 






















In this perspective, understanding always falls 
short. All possible understandings contribute no 
more than a system of models of reality, and the 
things we can be most certain of are only upwards 
absolute propositions—that is, if true now, then 
true in any larger model, but still limited to models. 
What is the typical logical form of the upwards 
absolute proposition? Own-truth in the moment. 
And so, reciprocally, affirming own-truth in the 
moment as the only form of certainty underscores 
































Generally I have accepted some such form of 
argument against scepticism as knowing that you 
don’t know, or that you may not know is none-
theless a knowing. It may be empty of content, but 
it establishes the subject in an uncompromising 
position oriented towards the empty space of 
knowing. This is a version of a number of similar 
moves all based on the being of the Subject. One 
cannot logically convert contingency into necessity, 
but these categories do not apply to the being of the 
subject, since even though it may well be con-
tingent, it is prior to the experience of necessity and 
so in a de facto sense is more necessary than 
necessity itself. The content of understanding can 
gain no warrant even from the Subject who appears 



























The Subject is subject to the fallacy of displaced 
necessity; an agent that can comprehend necessity 
need not itself be necessary even though it is de 
facto prior to the necessary, and even though its 
























78 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Why the petulant tone? Who are you trying to 
convince? The attempt to find a language that 
assuages the knowledge of heteronomy. In other 
words, I do not presume to be capable of knowing 
reality, but I wish to go as far as I can on the 
strength of the negative: to be oriented towards the 
place that truth would occupy if it were knowable. 
You have not answered my question; why do you 
want that? Even that is enough to give rise to some 
peace of mind amongst these ever changing con-
ditions. But this is still wanting something for the 
sake of something else. It seems that it is not so 
much peace of mind you want as security in your 
position—but can anything known, any attain-
ment, give that security? Better to say that I want 
the truth because I haven’t given up on the truth 
game, which is a competitive game with other 
“thinkers.” The trouble with all this is the as-
sumption that there is any such intention in the 
language of what any subject wants. 
78 
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Why is this “knowledge of heteronomy” so taken 
for granted? It is not simply reality testing, but a 
knowledge of being, as it were, marbled with 
otherness in the deepest grain of living. “Shadowed 
by a sweetly false identity” in the fullest sense. This 
seems to be an immediate datum, but isn’t it just 
the melancholy of scholars? There are even some 
scholars who argue fervently against it, but I am 
separated from them by an impenetrable and trans-
parent screen of irony. 
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80 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
There is no such thing as mind, and when I use 
this word I refer to a sort of short-hand grasp of 
reality—an awareness of compressing the mass 
of data by a process of selection and represen-
tation: i.e., metonymy. Example of mind: when 
the plane takes off and I look down at the 
cityscape spread out below me I can still con-
strue this as the city for me, part of my world, 
even though it is purely abstract, vision only. 
There is no way of reconnecting what I’m 
seeing to the fullness of sensory and imaginative 
experience—even if the plane were to crash. It is 
like paper money.	  Most of our experience in the 
world is necessarily of this order, so that we 
may navigate such complexity. This is mind: the 
banks are always in doubt—the currency chan-
ges, or is not interchangeable, or is rendered 
meaningless by inflation. 
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Metonymy, especially synechdoche, has always ap-
peared to me the most sexual of tropes; conversely, 
sexual desire itself seems to be a performative sy-
nechdoche. Romance is thus metonymy pretending 

























82 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Furthermore, there is no such thing as con-
sciousness. Where could one find the evidence that 
consciousness exists—in any sense? There is a sense 
of contrast with what is not consciousness: the 
body, or sleep. These accompany us all the time, 
but one cannot find the line that separates these 
from consciousness—cannot, properly speaking, 
even find grades of consciousness; all are equally 
phenomena. Actually, even if there were such a 
line, or such grades, we necessarily could not find 
















Mind: experience of differences—of different con-
texts (e.g., “pictures,” “dreams,” “movies,” “stories,” 
“realities,” etc.). The ability to make the adjust-
ments needed to move through these: this requires 
or implies comparison, memory, and a sense of 
being the same one in the midst of passing con-
ditions. The evidence for such transition is difficult 
to rationalise; the paradoxes of change and con-
tinuity are as old as Parmenides. One can take up a 
different way of seeing all of this—from the point 
of the present, anamorphically—but it entails a 


















84 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
The structure of the world implies some 
parameters of order—a definite underlying top-
ology to the understood cosmos. There is a 
shape to things, a metaphysical shape, but that 
only by virtue of being the obverse side to what 
is necessarily implied by perception and con-
ception. As in Frieden’s physics, the parameters 
of order might emerge as the solution to certain 
equations, as the reality that is required by 
general conditions of possibility. Second order 
equations with two independent solutions: the 
standard and the non-standard. One has its 
chief singularity at the origin, and the other at 
infinity. Isn’t that just what we see? 
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Mountains and rivers: “the subject is an infinite 
task and the moment by moment failure of 
completion gives rise to the world as we know it” 
vs. “Subject is equivalent to the (infinite) posing of 
a question, which may simply be taken to be always 
already solved.” The answer could never be known 
either way, so the only significant difference is in 
how the “mystery” is regarded. Rigorously follow 
through on the implications of this. Now we have a 
truly finite world. It turns out that the infintary es-
capement mechanism of meaning was unneces-


















86 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
It is a law of appearance that no worldview can 
be decisively proven true or false. What sort of 
mechanism is needed to bring this effect about? 
Or, does it show how much hedging there is 
even at the deepest layers of mind? 
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This process of simply looking, to see how it is just 
here, is disingenuous. One way of testing this is to 
ask, “Am I whole or a part”? In the language of 
pure subjectivity, one must answer whole, because 
no objective division can be perceived, but clearly 
in any effective sense a moment of consciousness is 
just the illuminated tip of an unknowable moun-
tain. One gets around this by superimposing the 
indefinite unknown onto the equally unknown 
source of consciousness. There is a certain violence 
to this identification—one insists that the salient 
quality is from the side of consciousness and begins 
to smuggle in its kinfolk, ideas—but in fairness, it is 
the other side that should prevail—the one that 















88 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
It is undeniable that in the last instance our weal or 
woe is entirely dependent on our beliefs. This is 
somewhere between a self-fulfilling prophecy and a 
tautology, but to make this into a technology for 
















“Through the iron gates of life.” When this sense is 
most acute, the gates lead not into life—that is, 



























90 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
How much shallow and false subjectifying there 
is hidden under the word “seeming.” Above all, 
reality must be seem-less. 
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What is it to have a body or to be a body? Is there 
any verb that applies to the relation between what 
changes and what does not? There are many bodies 
that overlap and which are in continual change. 
The logistical body, the pleasure body, the pain 
body, the specular body, the solid body, the trans-
parent body, the abject body, the “brother ass,” etc. 
This living, such as it comes to read or write these 
words, is the continual combustion of a core of 
bodies, like the glowing tip of a stick of incense.  It 
is senseless to say “I am the body”; rather, look to 
see if any body says “I am.” Neither the genitals, the 
heart, nor the eyes say this, although the body 
















92 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
If we are presented with an image, it is inde-
terminate whether this points us to the object or 
the subject responsible for that image. This 
makes more than art possible; it is the condition 
of even the most banal act of seeing. We can 
say, “there is only the seeing,” but this tends to 
minimize the paradoxical nature of seeing, and 
indeed of all perception, which in every modal-
ity partakes of the same ambiguity. In space 
held open by this indeterminacy we can see the 
















Beauty, desire, and enjoyment are three forms of 
interpellation. The subject-object which is inter-
pellated is brought into play by this event, and 
hence is always in correspondence with Other, and 
thus expresses a characteristic figure of alienation. 
The “me” of desire is the me that harbours the 
Other who desires. The “me” that enjoys is that 
which contains the Other insofar as it is ultimately 
me. The “me” that experiences beauty is the in-




















94 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
What happens when we gaze steadily into each 
other’s eyes? A short-circuiting of social space, 
as all the meanings this could have (and there 
are layers upon layers of these) are gently put 
aside. It is held, and in that holding the habitual 
constancies can blank out momentarily. A short-
circuiting of metaphysical space occurs as well. 
An event prevails, fed by two streams of life that 
know each other in nameless nakedness in this 
indeterminacy. The other’s life: utterly opaque 
and yet infinitely transparent. 
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The tremendous polyphony of life is overlooked 
when we filter it through the narrow focal field of 
attention. Just say that attention is like an elastic 
lens that faces on to an infinite event. This lens 
selects a more or less large, finite fragment of event 
and squeezes all the rest into a two-dimensional 
anamorphosis. The size of the focal field may 
smoothly change, as may the clarity or opacity of 
the anamorphic fringe. Any area of event that can 
enter the focus must first become, or have been, 
salient within the fringe. Focus and fringe remain 
interdependent counterparts, although they are far 
from symmetric. In a certain reduced language, 
















96 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
In introspection, it is impossible to observe any-
thing that precisely matches this picture, and 
yet meditating on the picture brings about a 
change in the quality of consciousness. 
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Reality is appearance and appearance is reality. 
There is nothing else either of them could be. And 
yet as appearance, it is subject to a continual un-
folding, self-revelation, and endless disillusion-
ment, while as reality it never changes at all. This is 
sublimely unproblematic simply because reality is 























98 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Consciousness may be likened to a parliament. 
Representatives of various interests—for example, 
feeding the body—can take the floor and general 
consideration be given to what they propose. Ac-
tions may be taken, or other agencies stimulated to 
contribute to the debate, or the subject may be 
changed as a different priority takes over before 
any specific action is taken. Debate on certain 
subjects may be gagged, and then it may happen 
that the deputies representing that interest keep up 
a sort of murmuring, or more, and the ongoing 
business is distorted by the avoidance. There is 
always an atmosphere in the chamber, which is the 
prevailing mood or emotional tone with which 
things proceed. This is basically the model of 
faculty psychology, and it is a good one as far as it 
goes. What is interesting is the status of various 
enabling fictions of the self. Is this a republic, or is 
there a sovereign of some sort? Or is it a bureau-
cratic tyranny?  Belief in the self—egoism—may be 
a sort of rhetorical performative function akin to 
patriotism, or else perhaps a legalism, or maybe as 
little as a sentimental attachment to the debate it-
self, while the real business goes on elsewhere. 
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The parliament model is one where an effective 
unity, the state or the self, is actually constituted 
by the relationship or compresence of a number 
of agents that, individually, are of an entirely 
different kind of function. It is a metaphor that 
enables some phenomenological insight into 
the heteronomy of the self. In fact, this hetero-
nomy is by its very nature beyond any such 
phenomenology, but that is itself a pheno-
menological observation. It belongs, however, 



















100 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Bringing attention to bear upon the felt 
body, we discover what we have always 
known. This sense of the body is the ever-
present horizon of all the conscious pro-
cesses of which we can say that they are 
“ours.” It is not a single sense; the fringe of 
awareness is in no way monological, nor 
does it synthesise the plural in any way. It 
seems to extend into the deeper core of obli-
vion, and so attention may move further, 
even into this. And it makes the same 
discovery at each new depth: that it was al-
ways implicitly known. In this way, one 
comes to a knowledge of the unconscious 
matrix of all felt bodies—the body proper, 
the ding an sich. Knowledge? Whatever it is, 
it cannot be triangulated from the ontology 
that belongs to purposeful consciousness. 
But seeing all of this, why would one even 
dream of doing so? 
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“The part of the mind we call self [is], 
biologically speaking, grounded on a 
collection of non-conscious neural patterns 
standing for the part of the organism we call 

























102 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Non-conscious precisely because it is ground 
for even the most subtle feeling, which it 
enables as some kind of relationship. In the 
same way, phenomenologically speaking, the 
self is the ultimate subject or experient, and 
is also non-conscious since, by definition, it 
cannot experience itself. And yet, that there 
is non-experiential knowledge of the self is 
evidenced by our possession of the concept 
“Being.” To make this seem less proble-
matic, reflect on the fact that the paradigm 
for the signified is the felt body. 
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Reference to the body proper means signifying 
the self. Body proper is non-conscious, and yet 
this signifying act achieves its goal because body 
proper really is there prior to any act or ref-
erencing. This is what bootstraps a conscious-
ness that is paradoxical to itself, since, in terms 























104 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
How long did it take for the mind to produce 
such a concrete metaphor for itself in action, for 
itself worlding as, for example, a strip of movie 
film? As a metaphor it is almost random, as if a 
heavy voice emerges from the mist and man-
ages to enunciate, “I am something like this.” 
Who is speaking, and can we ever again find the 
place where we first heard those words? 
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How does a consciousness harbour an other 
consciousness, which it always does, which 
it must, almost by definition? Not by way of 
the blind spot of the subject, although this 
seemed the natural place to look. Rather, via 
























106 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
In the neurologist’s perspective, the instances of 
“human life” are put together like a puzzle 
made of interlocking blocks. The shapes of 
these blocks correspond to brain structures, but 
subjectively to nothing we can name. Take them 
out one by one and first personhood and then 
raw subjectivity collapse like a house that is 
being torn down. This is the most salient 
premise for the material determination of con-
sciousness, even if, for the idealist, who does 
not draw any boundaries around the experi-
ment, matter itself is just a law which con-
sciousness has given to itself. 
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All of this, interdependent and interpenetrating 
spheres of being—appearance, feeling, action, 
personhood, sociality, etc.—is laboriously as-
sembled in each child and slowly disassembled 
in each dying body. It can barely glimpse the 
real in the name of which all of this is taking 
place, and it stammers about God, death, 
cosmos, nature, evolution, or love. At some 
point in this career, to tear its knowing free of 
such wretched anthropomorphisms and speak! 



















108 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
The neurologist presents a physicalist version of 
the Vedanta’s neti-neti (“not this, not this”). 
Are you X (some brain structure)? No, since it 
is ob-jective. Then, let’s remove it. Snip. Now, 
tell me, are you still here? This goes on until the 
eyes glaze over and not the slightest movement 
can answer, “Present.” 
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Seeking for the minimal unit of awareness, as if 
for the glowing point buried beneath secondary 
structures that have merely reflected it, one 
regresses to more primitive forms of conscious-
ness. Instead, ask what emerges when the or-
ganism is maximally activated, when all systems 























110 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
If Man’s fall was through the temptation to 
know (himself), then it merely images God’s 
fall in initiating creation. The martyr is an in-
verse Christ. He so loves God that he takes 
upon himself God’s sin and suffers the justi-
fiable rage of men against the creator of their 
world. It is not that men are wrong to hate God 
for creating them; the creation is detestable pre-
cisely so that only God becomes lovable. 
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This “precisely” is characteristically masculine. 
Woman has a greater rage against God than 
man, and a far greater love for him. Her irony: 
she reminds man that one must first have loved 
in order to hate, and that only through the 
strength of his love could his negation be strong 























112 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Why does it always seem a good thing to yet 
more rigorously think on the interdependence 
of consciousness and embodiment? Is it that we 
have to keep being reminded of something, fail-
ing which we drift into unsustainable vanities, 
or is it that only in this direction does more of 
the world open to us? These are diametrically 
opposed alternatives—the finite and the infin-
ite, the ironic and the sincere—although they 
share exactly the same ethic. 
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The problem of materialism is that matter is a 
concept. One appeals, then, to real matter prior 
to any concept, but this is ding an sich and our 
relation to it is sublime at the very least. This a 
delicate point where others have fallen into 
massive idealisms; how can one remain here in 
the tenderest possible acknowledgement of be-






















114 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Every moment of consciousness, whether wak-
ing or dreaming, has an objective and a subjec-
tive pole. The subjective poles are necessarily 
objective as well, although, lacking an even 
deeper subjective pole to manifest them, they 
may be unconscious objectivities, or proto-
selves in Damasio’s terminology. The subjective 
poles are unified according to an unconscious 
concept or category into what we call self, 
which is both single and multifarious. In rare 
moments we can see that consciousness itself 
does not require all this process, which is 
pathetic in the extreme. Consciousness has fall-
en in love with that pathos. This explains what 
















The strange joy of pissing on one’s own grave. 
What lies mouldering there, blindly giving up 
its elements beneath some solemn epitaph, but 
the mass of all that it was ever about? And the 
piss? Water of love free from all loving. Be that 
as it may, unless I speak from the grave, I am 























116 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
This most banal of states: mute, somatic, naus-
eous, enclosed. The very state that all ideas, 
pleasures, and projects offer to lead out of, and 
the very one they are somehow nostalgic for. A 
refusal of all description, all communication, all 
acknowledgment—the grey nothing, cool, dis-
illusioned, moving just enough within itself to 
prevent any answering for itself. 
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To whom does this moment belong? If it is part 
of someone’s life, then it and that someone lie 
in a finite dimension that begins and ends with 
nameless passivity, a dimension that always 
promises just because it cannot make good on 
any of its promises. The person is brought 
about by death, because only death enframes 
that which pertains to the person, itself utterly 
not pertaining to the person. And yet if there 
was a person, it would pertain; hence, no per-



















118 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
This living a life, tracing out multiple pathways 
through bands of limitation, temporally, spat-
ially, energetically, empathically, cognitively, 
etc., is what we know we know. How much else 
do we know but not know that we know? How 
far do the limits of what is too obvious to be 
seen extend, of what, recognising which, we are 
amazed that we ever could have left home in the 
forgetting of it? By definition, it is impossible to 
put a bound on this, and yet it is a profound 
decision even to hold such a category open. 
117 
DAVID ODELL 119 
“The contentions of philosophies forms strong 
evidence that we venture beyond the consensual 
critique of knowing armed only with aesthetic 
judgements, those quasi-objective expressions 
of our physiology. Similarly, the consensus 
establishes the status of the unknown to be only 
that which is answerable to its methods of 
questioning.” And what if some of what we 
know, but do not know we know, is the un-
motivated circularity of all this, and who we 
were when we ordained it? 
118 
120 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
A gnostic insight always results from applying 
pressure to that strange concept, knowing. The 
concept is an attempt to crystallise something of 
what is signified by the word “pressure” here, 
but more significantly it is a concept which 
describes a movement in which its own subject 
dissolves, a movement of the subject which nec-
essarily ends with the annihilation of that sub-
ject. This is why, like all true concepts, it has no 
















“When I die, the universe dies with me.” 
There are as many deaths as there are uni-
verses for this to be either true or not. Who 
can say anything about death? It points, 
however, to a recognition of this very being 
as grounding all of being. This is not the 
same as to say, “Everything is, within my 
awareness, since only in awareness can it be 
known to be.” Awareness, or consciousness, 
when closely examined, is not identical to it-
self; its inner precondition is always already 
unawareness or unconsciousness, and that is 
just what it is. One can say that it rests on 
the body proper, but since this body is to 
provide the ground of this very universe, 
being that without which nothing is, it must 
be of a this-ness beyond any understanding 
of body. Giving of being is what I most truly 
am, what I most truly know, without know-










122 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
With what trunk do I reach within myself to 
feel this rumbling of being? An elephant’s or a 
tree’s, with blood or nerves or marrow—not 
mine, but an Other’s? This sense: the genus of 
which all the rest are merely species. 
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Turning to death as we walk, we are at last 
ready to receive its gift: to live once. Even in 
describing this, I deny its finality. Which of  


























124 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
An evening walk—spontaneous memories crowd 
in, briefly illuminating, like distant lightning, 
the unsuspected vastness of the simple interior 
space. These hands, these clothes, this room, 
now in the forty-ninth year of a life, all of this, 
utterly embodied, utterly specific, is the know-
ingness. There is no stranger who observes 
from a vanishing point in a perspective. Model-
ling by perception, one mistakes consciousness 
for a point and its contents for objects, but this 
knowingness is the space identical to its own 
contents. The contents may unfold according to 
the laws of the known, such as association, and 
this movement runs right through the heart of 
knowingness; it is its freedom. This is why 
spontaneous memories mock our belief in lin-
ear time and try to wake us from it. 
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Imagine a plurality in which each item 
could be known only as either foregrounded 
or as an indefinite member of the back-
ground. This could not be counted, since 
each item could only be attended to as “one” 
and, when not attended to, could only be 
sensed as possibly co-present and insep-
arable but not as “already counted” or “yet 
to be counted.” (Possibly co-present has ex-
actly the same valence as possibly co-ab-
sent.) This is a more primordial—that is, 
bodily—experience of plurality, compared 

















126 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
In the order of knowing rather than of per-
ception, relations of  “items” have the same sal-
ience as “items,” and relations of relations and 
all such. There is simply no exhaustive relation 
which could function as a counting. The ideo-
logical aspect of rational consciousness—the 
essence of which is the possibility in all instan-
ces of such a counting—is like a spectral reson-
ance, a single eigenvector of a space-like know-
ing among just such an indefinite plurality of 
eigenvectors. This simile, like the one drawn 
from the non-synthetic plurality of the felt 
body, is a going away from here in order to 
















It is impossible to pass from linear to spatial 
consciousness, since passage is a linear concept. 
There is no one to whom it could happen be-
cause it is realised in lieu of such a one. There is 
a supercession, and in it, the former under-
standing is seen not to have ever been an under-
standing at all; the latter is realised to have 
always prevailed. What was thought to have 
been understanding was a kind of project, 
standing in for a fullness that was required, but 
defined to be impossible. The knowing of that 
impossible was in fact the only point of reality 

















128 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Although there is no logical path that leads 
from one frame of core self-understanding to 
another more encompassing one, there is a kind 
of transformation of truth actions which per-
fectly expresses it. (This could perhaps even be 
symbolised in the language of mathematical 
Category Theory.) But how is an emotional 
state like this one, whatever it might be, re-
vealed as a pattern of truth actions? What I call 
truth actions are not the same as beliefs—at 
least, not my beliefs, and not quite beliefs with-
out a believer either. It is as if I am traversed by 
an Other’s beliefs. And not just one Other, a 
plurality indefinite as to time and space and 
region of being; in this traversal, the self is 
divided and offered to the multitude with 
painfully blind generosity. 
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Myself as a being amongst beings is the lie 
through which the truth of Being can first be 
glimpsed. The lie is known to be a lie because it 
cannot account for the difference that grounds 
the “amongst,” and so it points inexorably to 
the non-place of Being where it is the very non-
existence of difference which grounds indefinite 
plurality. This is strange, because in its own 
realm, Being is utterly undifferentiated, and yet 
in expression or phenomenality it is what makes 
distinction possible, like a tiny mote in a super-
saturated solution that triggers crystallisation. 
And in this manifestation, that mote is found at 
the point where the crystallisation is densest 
and hence most fractured—in the centre of 














130 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
When I sit at my ease and look out over some 
vista, landscape, or cityscape, where a play of 
space meets a play of surface, then imper-
ceptibly I melt, with the myriad associations, 
into a deeper vista, knowing “myself more truly 
and more strange.” When there are other peo-
ple included in the scene, it works differently; I 
am no longer spread equally over the field of 
transparency and opacity. The face and the 
body of each person that I include gathers and 
bunches me; each of them holds an infinity into 
which I could fall—if they were open, or even if 
they are not—through the cracks in their 
presentation, through what I could loosely call 
their presentiment. As if to ask, “Where is the 
first place where ‘we’ can be?” and then to drop, 
as in a rapidly descending elevator, right out of 
time and space. 
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The outer limit of imagination: a new world 
and a new enjoyer locked in a wholly new em-
brace. The inner limit of imagination: this old 
enjoyer, stripped of all powers and presump-
tive rights, and the world as it has always been, 
just for him. The fire of life, which is not from 
us, feeds the journeying between these extrem-
es. And always with just a bit too much passion, 





















132 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
It is remarkable that we can forget our pri-
mordial sociality to such a degree that the “con-
stitution of intersubjectivity” seems to be a le-
gitimate question. What is the evidence for 
basal solipsism? We die alone, we fear others, 
we can never know what they are thinking 
much less understand them, we must study to 
bend them to our will, and so on.	  Nevertheless, 
all of these must be constituted on prior 
sociality, and it is easy to sketch out the lines. 
What an absurd imposture the solitary self is! It 
is a myth that gives consistency to our emo-
tions, our desires, and our ignorance. And to 
our loves as well? 
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In all of this which does not know knowing or 
bounding in any way, this carrying forth of a 
nameless world into a formless world, there are 
these crystallizations, such as this writer, or this 
reader and their non-identity with the “I” and 
“you” of the grammar.  In every instance it is 
the implied relationships that give surety to this 
point of thought, which invest it with a pathos 
that strangely ghosts an impossible—a laugh-
able—pretence at Subjectivity. In a strange twist 
it is the putative metaphysical Subjectivity be-
hind the grammatical subjectivity that gives 
definiteness to whatever relationships are chos-
en from the indefinite fringe of possibilities. But 
since in reality there is nothing to do this, rela-
tionships melt into their space of possibility, 













134 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
When I was a child, having discovered the 
strange power of spontaneous memories, I set 
about manufacturing them by carefully linking 
what was memorable in a scene with my over-
flowing sense of personal being. The power to 
do this seemed to diminish noticeably as I grew 
older, and from some point on, perhaps around 
six or eight years of age, I entered into the dis-
pensation which has continued ever since, in 
which a mental self, like someone hired for the 
job, attempts to competently administer this 
personal reality. This is a response to a social 
and cultural complexity in which that same 
overflowing of being is refracted in myriad ways 
before returning to its source. We have never 
left the space of epiphany. 
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It is not whether there is or is not free will 
(whatever that could mean), and it is not whe-
ther there is or is not some real space of pos-
sibilities in which this, here now, lies, as some 
speculate; it is simply that when we construct 
this moment for ourselves as one that could be 
different, as provisional or as a means—for us—
we are drawing over our eyes the veil of a false 





















136 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Between waking reality and dream reality there 
is this difference: that in waking reality, mater-
ial things speak to us when we closely attend to 
them. They hold us with their gaze, whereas in 
dreams we wander blindly within our own gaze. 
What it is that material things are saying to us 
we do not know; it may well be that they are 
trying to tell us that we are dreaming. “To 
practice and confirm all things by conveying 
one’s self to them, is illusion; for all things to 
advance forward and practice and confirm the 
self, is enlightenment” (Dōgen). 
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“We are dreaming,” not as the answer to “What 
are we doing?” but to “What are we?” This is 
not a simple assertion but a dialectical seed, like 
Hegel’s “Substance is Subject.” Dreaming: sub-
ject and world co-arise interdependently. Real-
ity unfolds in depth, like the petals of an endless 
flower. We inhabit thoughts as we inhabit our 
bodies, and our bodies as thoughts; they appear 
to flow with the prevailing conditions. The 
dreamer is absent. The dreaming knows dream-
er and dreamed, but what forms its ground is 


















138 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Prior to all these fine abstractions, this hum-
ming, this strange blind presencing, this flitting 
of attention, this body, this kind of nesting in 
things, the spine, the breath, the vague tensions 
playing through the frame, the frames, the skin, 
the scalp, the smell of fingers that have worked, 
the itches, the general comportment in things, 
the forgetting of where this is, the solicitations 
of half-finished tasks, the reminders, the expec-
tations, the feel of glass, the taste of water … All 
these elements with no proper names that are 
















Formal relations always include a certain sym-
metry, a reversibility of agents, or an inter-
dependence. The other kind of relation—real, 
temporal, bodily, finite, all too human—is rad-
ically asymmetrical. When we discover an un-
expected symmetry in bodily relations, as in 
sadomasochism, this seems profound—a con-
crete metaphysics—but when we search for 
such a symmetry in our anguish, we are merely 




















140 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
“Birth is like a man riding in a boat. Although 
the man prepares the sails, steers the course, 
and poles the boat along, it is the boat which 
carries him, and without which he cannot ride. 
By riding in a boat he makes this boat a boat. 
We must consider this moment. At such a 
moment there is nothing but the boat’s world. 
The heavens, the water, and the shore all 
become the boat’s time, which is never the same 
as the time that is not the boat. By the same 
token, birth is what I give birth to, and I am 
what birth makes me. When one rides in a boat, 
one’s body-mind and the dependent and proper 
rewards of karma are altogether the boat’s 
dynamic working; the entire great earth and the 
entire empty sky are altogether the boat’s dy-
namic working. Such is the I that is birth, the 
birth that is I.”  
   Dōgen 
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A smokier metaphor: we are like a radio 
station. There are recurring programmes 
which give a character to the station. Each 
one is a “show,” a kind of presencing and 
responsiveness, but with its own style, its 
own self-reference, its own kind of nostal-
gia. Presenters come and go, and although 
shows may outlast the presenters they too 
go, in time. And in time, even the character 
of the station changes, sometimes unrecog-
nisably. The management changes, the audi-
ence changes, the advertisers change, but it 
is still the same station, transmitting on the 
same frequency. Here, so many different 
paths intersect, so many different agendas, 
different causal streams. They meet up in a 
certain way and a “show” arises. It goes on 
for a while and seems to its listeners to be 
something fixed, to be so of the moment 
that it creates a platform of stability within 
it, but then it too changes. What remains 
constant in all of this, like the earth and the 
sky for the man in the boat? Perhaps only 






142 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
All of this is to say that presencing is homo-
tropic and that it is illuminated by an awareness 
that is, at its core, calm, intent, and heartful. 
Homotropic here tries to indicate a super-
spatiality; if we go from a point awareness to a 
spatial awareness, when this spatial awareness 
in turn reflects upon itself, it sees that “space” 
was only ever a device to uphold the topology of 
the point. It can then naturally realise itself as 
homotropic—that is, the same in every spatial/ 
non-spatial, temporal/non-temporal articulation. 
It says more, however. In many ways, this very 
refined understanding is only needed in order 
to illuminate being in a body, being a body, or 
being embodied; living the body’s time and 
space, being so interfused with this nervous, 
electric machine of blood and muscle that each 
one of our thoughts carries an aroma of the 
kitchen or the sick room or the love bed. This 
body, which is spread out in subjective ana-
















Some words that are said arouse a hurt. 
How is this possible? The point of the hurt 
is not initially in the forefront of con-
sciousness; it is part of the area which I 
think to be already secure, so that I can 
stand where I do in relation to what comes. 
As if one of my support team is suddenly 
knocked down. Their usual function is to 
monitor what passes and to deflect any 
possible threat in it by anticipating it; they 
are like antibodies, and their overlapping 
scope is uneasily reassuring, most of the 
time. When one is flatly contradicted and 
falls, there is a pull of energy back towards 
where it stood and away from the focal 
plane of present awareness. Creativity is 
needed to repair the loss. In the resulting 
distorted field, emotional thoughts arise 
recurrently; each is like a play or a movie 
performed in relation to a missing first 
person. The planning mind is drawn to this 
scene in order to use these simulations to 
secure a way to a future restoration of equi-
librium. The protagonist of these plays, as 
projected forward by planning, is the puta-
tive self. Since it can have no direct sensory 
or synaesthetic evidence, a bodily feeling 
around the heart is enlisted as a proxy for it. 
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144 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
The body feeling is always the place where 
subject just was, the seat still warm as 
evidence that there really was someone 
there just a moment ago. This complex 
temporal structure is the play of mirrors 
that makes the subjective sense of pain so 
vivid, as if the clarity of consciousness could 
be scattered and dull. 
	  












When we look closely to see what is taking 
place, we are no longer in what was taking 
place, but in this looking, and the scene that 
now reveals itself is guided by its “taste” for 
certain kinds of unveiling; it is a sort of strip-
tease of the mind. In the same way, there are 
certain topoi of the understanding as it faces 
onto inwardness, and it is not any conform-
ation of ourselves into one of these that we seek 




















146 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Cancelling with preservation, or sublation, 
is in fact a triangulation. The first two or 
more terms do not have to be antithetical as 
such, merely different and yet of the same 
level, so that, seeing them together, we are 
forced almost out of embarrassment to 
move to an unsuspected level that encomp-
asses both. Cancelling without preservation, 
which Eliot Deutsch calls subration—the 
movement of collapsing an illusion, as when 
the snake is seen to have been a rope—is 
also an expansion of comprehension, an 
awakening to, but this time unprovoked, 
and perhaps unprovokable by contradiction. 
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Between these paragraphs, there are numerous 
invisible paragraphs that express in eloquent 
ways the belief in the impossibility of writing. 
What ends up being written always exists in 
context of this invisibility. It is not only that the 
visible and the invisible enable each other, but 























148 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
This, the patent word stream, gains its full 
sense both as act and product by its relation 
to a silent questioning, an inexpressibility, a 
mute stress of physical being. Otherwise, to 
assimilate the words to life (as, say, expres-
sion) is to equate life with the strange death-
in-life of text. Another way of saying this is 
to claim these markings as human signature. 
It is not about the self who is the agent of 
some moment’s unsuccessful pull to master 
itself, but about the life diffused selflessly 
and equally across all the various pulls that 
meet in this moment. These include a heav-
iness in the belly, and the sound of my chil-
dren’s voices, and the look in a woman’s 
eyes as she faces me, and time itself in all its 
dimensions.     
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Sometimes it so happens that I say in my 
heart, “This is good.” These occasions nei-
ther refute nor embrace the rushed quality, 
but they augment it because they leave noth-
ing for measurement when measurement, in 
its turn, comes. As if at one time I could find 
a home in this passing goodness that sealed 
my kinship with the world, but now it is the 
sharpest portent of homelessness, because I 
see that even my heart will not accompany 
me all along the way that I am going. The 
heart is filled with this goodness, but the 

















150 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
When a movement happens deep in the core 
of my being, like a shifting of the ballast in 
the lowest hull of a ship, it becomes clear 
how little any willed or planned suspension 
of spirit can reach that adagio e sostenuto 
which is the long-sought counterweight to 
everything that is known about life. Below 
all decks is below the diaphragm, below 
even the rumbling of the engines to where 
the true basso resides. What sweet words 
could I find which could slowly withdraw 
and point the way to the silence wherein this 
ever-present sound is heard? 
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Observe the habit of the mind which re-
creates this sense of itself erect and salient 
within the known and inflowing world. A 
certain commentary is maintained in which 
I am distinguished by my wit or quirkiness 
or even by the readiness with which I absorb 
contradiction, and there is a gentle reflect-
ion of this commentary which witnesses its 
uniqueness, as if I am in need of formal 
definition. This is a defensive constitution, 
sophisticated enough to absorb its own un-
doing (for the most part), an undoing which 
is posed in the form of an encounter with a 
stronger formal uniqueness in an other. We 
play this game, and different teams gain 
possession of the ball and score or fail to 
score as time passes, but no one ever be-












152 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
What is it to be filled with a strong emotion that 
cannot readily be described? And what can be 
said in the midst of this about the kind of con-
sciousness on which it arises? There would be 
less interest here if it were not for the utter in-
difference to commentary that is integral to it. 
The possibility of bringing this into relation 
with truth seems utterly gratuitous, verum is so 
obviously factum that we see that it doesn’t 
refer to anything but the cult of the process 
which brings it about. The emotion is a rival 
process; in gaining precedence, it shows that the 
scope of the subject may be limited to the nar-
rowest range of feeling without in any way 
diminishing the essence of subjecthood, to use a 
clumsy phrase for what at other times, say, 
grounds the realm of truth in own-being, and 
with just as much obviousness. 
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At this stage, what embodies the personal tone 
that recurs in these words is not the content or 
even the target, but the attack—the precise 
degree of predictability or the gently resigned 
tone of the analysis. What we call “identi-
fication” is analogous to this; it is a music of the 
body within, but not wholly absorbed by, the 
music of the world. For this to be of any use, we 
must ask what are the minimal conditions for 
the hearer of music who experiences not only 
ideas of order, but the will inherent in temporal 


















154 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
As long as there is some sort of dialogue within 
consciousness, there will always be this para-
digmatic shifting and circling—themes and var-
iations. Even where a maximum of signification 
is occurring, the mind cannot help dancing with 
itself. Consciousness is equated with the most 
lucid maps of reality, but the insight that these 
fail utterly does not appear on any map. This is 
old news perhaps, but the implications of that 
non-appearance are still hotly contested. 
152 
DAVID ODELL 155 
At its most earnest, humanism emerges out of 
Christianity because of a suspicion of a lack of 
gravity in the notion of an afterlife. In the end, 
the meditation on death—which contemplates 
the surrender of transcendental consciousness 
as well as of personal consciousness—leads into 
a post-humanism. Here, extreme passivity—an 
intellectual image derived from the fact of the 
corpse—is given an always-paradoxical sover-
eignty. It is a strange and sophisticated muta-
tion of the cult of the thing. The post-humanist 
face of the Other is only revealed in the dead 
body, or one of its rhetorical stand-ins. So if a 
certain thinking pairs Kant with de Sade, then 
the same thinking could pair Levinas with the 
Serial Killer. 
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156 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
The understanding of understanding is limited; 
there is no touchstone of truth in it. We can 
scour ethics, epistemology, psychology, or even 
mathematics for solid premises to ground the 
proof of transcendental consciousness, and it is 
in vain. Similarly, nothing in everyday life nece-
ssitates a separable witness consciousness, and 
the evidence from neurology further erodes any 
probability of such.  And yet, what of the con-
sciousness that requires no proof—that cannot 
be found because it is the seeking itself? At least 
see that it conforms to none: none of the con-
















As if attention has become charged with static 
electricity, it repels itself; it won’t gather, but 
moves within kinaesthetic space from one fray-
ed excess to another in that nervous illusion of 
wind. This is the counterweight to those in-
ternal states celebrated as self or soul. It is 
convex where they are concave, not allowing 
anything to dwell: no voice, no presence, no 
vanities of being or of representing the un-
accommodated one—the original one whose 
physiology would register the traces of the path 
travelled. In essence, just as much this as the 
other, because embodiment is to be traversed by 
innumerable paths, questions, answers, reflect-
ions, and interpellations, which weave twisted 
and non-recurring courses through every mode 













158 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
We can say that there are positive and negative 
selfhoods; they are different economies of con-
sciousness and they have different theories of 
the self, since that is part of what a “selfhood” 
is. There is a flow of states and instances in the 
body and the heart and the mind, and these 
“selves” are temporary stabilities that appear 
therein, maintained by all the ruses of quasi-
reflexivity, something like that. We can say 
“there are” or “there is” … whatever. The pro-
blem is already in this “there are/is.” We can 
attach it to everything, like Kant’s “I think,” but 
that is a kind of retrospection.	  In immediate ex-
perience, even the simplest feeling in no way 
falls under a simple “is.” This is not to empty it, 
but to see that it be neither emptied nor filled. 
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Leaving the cinema this afternoon after attend-
ing a matinee with my children, we drove along 
a diagonal road straight towards the sun that 
had emerged from clouds low in the sky. The 
road was wet and the reflection was such that 
the entire length before us was a blindingly 
bright path of white light. Cars ahead of us 
shimmered and melted in silhouette, seeming to 
float gently in that no longer retinal space. It 
was sufficiently unusual to be remembered—
not so much portentous in itself as a pointer to 
some other submerged possibility, another point-
ing, another pointing indefinitely. How do I 
begin saying the truth without changing any-
thing, without any sort of position or imposture 
of knowledge? Everything already said is to be 
abandoned, yet one does not entrust to the mo-












160 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
E fango è il mondo. There is nothing closer to 
the core of this writing than the closure of every 
mental path, the nausea of interest that now 
prevails. This is because there is nowhere to move 
to and duration is experienced as pure tension, 
unbearable in itself and doubly unbearable in 
any attempted slide into mitigation. 
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If it were possible, I’d draw the attention of a 
reader to what the small blank time just before 
the first word here stands in for. Waves of 
tension building up in which no one can speak, 
in which there is only the scandal of my non-
existence, my implosion after the mechanical 
reflexes of a history of earnest subjectification. 
Oblique, deferred: the momentum of these liv-
ing moments in relation to the haven of a sub-
ject, of some sort of voice that would begin. 
This voice never begins in spite of the fact that 
words start to come, dedicated in their effortful 
way to giving some sort of expression to the 
















162 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Desire is a movement in being which does 
not subjectivise, but which is always the in-
tense expression of a possible subject, or of 
an inaccessible one, or of a destruction of 
any possible subject. Who would there be 
(here) failing any attempt to wear desire like 
a glove, or to be the perfect glove already for 
desire? And what sort of subject is it that 
invests so much in the sublimity of desire, 
confident of regaining himself on the other 
side of each violation, even with no memory? 
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Your life, his life, her life speak to me directly 
and without articulation. I hear you in the very 
wound of my own life, or else in its gentle aban-
donment. In this way we are always and already 
intimate prior to the defensive perversities of 
will that make us citizens of the psychological 
world. We are unaware of this soft world with 
its insistent tendrils, if we are unaware of it at 
all, in the way that we are unaware of a large 
and determining material reality, not like some 
soft sound drowned out by the noise of traffic. 
And yet, this place of deep intimacy is also, 
paradoxically but by its very nature, a place 
















164 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
In a reflection on the thoughts that successively 
paint the present moment in the course of a 
day, in a reflection which views them as from a 
future moment reduced to essentials, the pos-
sibility of numerous little openings of the true 
eye is projected in the little gap of conscious 
insufficiency that belongs to each scene. It is as 
though another consciousness is being offered, 
in which the future is redeemed from giving its 
heart to all this impermanence. Of course, one 
fails again and again to pick up the invitation, 
but that one is so interpellated by eternity still 
serves to justify the project of the present. The 
insufficiency one would like to court in this way 
lies at the far end of the understanding of the 
incompatibility of the basic terms of this whole 
story: present and future. 
162 
	  












Mechanisms such as the ability to form 
“theories of mind” and “theories of physics” 
have evolved to facilitate survival in a social 
group, in both senses: survival as a group and 
within a group. It is a further and later develop-
ment that this is turned around, that a “self” is 
constituted as the subject-object of all these 
exploratory categories originally directed tow-
ards a reality innocent of such a distinction. 
There is no reason to conclude that this is an 
illegitimate creation of mind, but as is the nat-
ure of such processes, it is an ongoing and slow-
ly self-correcting project that, at any time, 
shows ample evidence of its own prehistory. 
Wanting to know myself-in-time may be just 














166 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
This city is like a vast coral, it’s myriad cells 
and chambers formed by the psychic pro-
jections of the even more numerous souls 
that have at any time taken body within it. 
In spite of all the cultural differences, this 
collective and intrinsically mythic life of the 
city imprints a sort of family resemblance 
on all of its physiognomies without lessen-
ing in any way the extreme quality of each 
individual expression. “What have they done 
with their lives?”—the title of a book in 
which each page is a face. 
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Cultural forms, whether traditional or newly 
invented, minor or fully articulated, no longer 
serve as containers or as scenery for a life. That 
is, it is no longer as if they are the relatively 
fixed reference points against which the dia-
lectic of life could play itself out. It is certainly 
not that they have grown obsolete too quickly 
(because nothing becomes obsolete these days), 
but that they are themselves seamlessly merged 
in the no-longer dialectical movement that em-
braces subjective forms as well as cultural 
forms, and every context and meta-context that 
belongs to them. I can revisit the scene of a past 
epiphany and the interior movement, which 
renders the moment impossible to repeat, coin-
cides with the external movement, which has 
destroyed the aura of that locus. Both have been 
replaced by other moments that meet in an 
anti-epiphany. The dialectic of life was to issue 
in spiritual certainty; what is it that this non-









168 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
Poverty of spirit, willed but not chosen. 
Bare, I am unmoored from any selfhood. 
This is a surface paradox; only in the quick-
est moments of the waking self, knowing for 
a bright breathing instant that this is not a 
dream, did being stand open. And, having 
opened, the shells of past and of future—the 
mediums of self with its remembrances and 
















This I am which must be asserted at any cost 
and against all threats of usurpation—what is 
it? Wherever there is evidence of living light it 
will have already owned it, already been there; 
since it cannot do this at the level of content, it 
seeks to do so at the level of form. By my ess-
ence as the life of this life—the condition of any 
manifestation whatsoever—I already possess 
that self I see in you, which, at the level of con-
tent, is most painfully alienated. I am the bitter 
claimant to the priority of all sweetness, a 


















170 1: A RUSHED QUALITY (2000) 
An argumentative voice that makes no argu-
ments: this is literature to the degree that it is 
the staging of a sensibility, or, more accurately, 
a family of sensibilities. As such, the poles that 
mark its critical range are passion, wisdom, ran-
domness, naiveté, penetration, breadth, concen-
tration, and so on. It makes itself alone the 
better to be intimate with its addressee, with its 
anyone in particular, but still it is performance 
by inadvertence and could not otherwise be the 
work it is. Need it be a work at all, however, 
since finally the only begetter of these words is 




















































174 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
 
birth and death alternate, that winter and summer 
succeed each other, that all things glide along and 
move is a generally accepted proposition. But to me 
this is not so.” 
   Seng Chao 
“That
	  















there anything in experience that can provide a basis for 
knowledge of what is ultimately real, or even of what is 
necessarily real for me? Is some sort of transcendental 
deduction possible? In Kant’s time, the natural analogies 
for such a defence of experience were space, time, and 
mathematics, since these were at the heart of the most 
successful contemporary sciences. In our time, an equiv-



















176 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
xperience
of difference exhausts the metaphysical content of dif-
ference. In other words, the concept of difference is based 
in experience but is a generic concept and so cannot be 
pinned to a specific type of experience. In this way, it may 
seem to be prior to experience. This logical vastness or 
depth does not, however, warrant the transcendental de-
duction that difference is ultimately real. How does one 
thread one’s way from the experientially posterior to the 
metaphysically prior? The hoary old reflex that has 
reiterated this demand is of more interest than its solution. 
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difference were to be accepted as holding for the real, then 
we would be in a wholly discrete cosmos: ultimately, one 
of multiple solipsisms. This may be the case, but the 
imperative to keep this question open runs deeper than the 
links of a possible reasoning that would prove it to be so. 
Similar problems beset a deduction on behalf of any exper-




















178 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
is achieved strategically in relation to some end; this makes 
it actual. The world is developed like a film by solutions of 
appetite. The appetite for the real is like a developer that is 
too strong and erases the image. Whatever is posited stra-
tegically is always subject to revision; it does not support 
premises that go beyond its occasion. 
Difference 
DAVID ODELL 179 
as implied in the indelible solitude of the self, is none-
theless immanently transcendental; that is, it is wholly 
immanent, but stands in relation to all other immanences 
as if it were transcendental, as if it did faithfully represent 
being. This is one experiential axis of difference; the other 
which unfolds as the panoply of the world is (seeming-
ly) easily traced back to the self’s ability to differ from 
and within itself—its ability to dream. Where these in-
tersect, we can no longer speak of difference (nor of self) 
but must adopt a new word, such as “the open” (cf. 
the eighth ‘Duino Elegy’ of Rilke). 
Difference, 
180 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
may be possible as a logical or metaphysical deduction, the 
interest here is in an experiential deduction: to one lying 
awake in the dark, beset with a paradoxical demand—
abandon everything that will fall away and find that which 
abides. This is a venerable starting point. To it we must 
add: to one lying awake in the dark, there comes the 
realization that we are always lying awake in the dark. 
Furthermore, the second half of the demand is not so 
unequivocal. Who, within us or beyond us, could ask for 
that which abides? To describe it in this way is to beg the 
question. In the dark, we are called, but we know not to 
what or by what or even where to locate the addressee of 
this call. 
Whatever 
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are other starting points and other inquiries, yet, even of 
the most pragmatic, there is a sense that they take place 
within the frame of the same inchoate demand. We do not 
imagine animals as sharing this same imperative, yet when 
we try to imagine intentional robots, they are subject to it, 
and, a fortiori, when we imagine ourselves to be 
such knowledge-hungry robots. We are impatient to 
uncover our own impostures, as if to do so would quiet the 
rage. 
There 
182 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
are observations about the imagination, but to say so 
requires something like the Romantic imagination. What 
fulfils this function in a post-Romantic era? 
These 
DAVID ODELL 183 
body-self and the mental “me” are two modes of self that I 
can distinguish and alternate between in exploratory 
attention. A very deliberate effort of attention is required 
because these different modes play the same role in the 
ongoing organisation of experience and cannot appear in 
that role at the same time. Still, the mental “me” can 
appear to have been the observer of the body-self, but not 
vice versa. They answer to being the standing realities or 
immanent personae of that functioning self which gives 
itself over to oblivion in each inner event. 
The 
184 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
is possible, by a certain inner effort, to change the mode of 
attack of presence, and of the fading of the contents of 
perception and of sensation. In the same way, what is 
perceived outside the body and what is sensed inside it 
serve as events against which we construe differing forms 
of lived time. Examining this more closely, we may be 
inclined to subsume the content of perception into the 
general sphere of the contents of bodily sensation; we may 
do this without loss of transcendence since there is no 
possible limit to the forms of lived time. At any rate, the 
salient contrast is with (discursive) thought, about which 
none of the above is true. 
It 
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thought, then, is not distinguishable from the flow of lived 
time, which it indeed seems to fix in an unequivocal sense. 
Its grammar, in both implicit and explicit insistence, 
provides the topology of linearisation for that temporality 
in which we will always strive in vain to recover ourselves. 
Discursive 
186 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
most blatant form of discursive thought is silent inner 
speech, and this mostly has a more or less optional 
character. Even so, when we exercise the apparent choice 
to stem the flow of this speech, to halt the process of its 
forum, we merely still certain facial muscles and are able 
to sense that we have already acceded to the little bright 
sentential capsules that shoot from we know not where 
into the space of our attention. Regardless of this, at each 
moment, we find ourselves in an ever changing life 
situation; the colouring and the solicitations that it bears 
with it as it comes over to us are also discursive (although 
less obviously and less optionally so), and, by that very 
discursivity, belong all the more fatally to us. This 
incessant process where feeling and quantity of life are 
transformed into narrative is where we naturally, un-
thankingly, find ourselves. 
The 
	  















arise in the space where other narratives break off. This 
breaking off is the appropriate mode of ending for any 
story, since it leaves the possibility open for resumption. 
Stories within stories, divagations, deferrals, multiple 
threads: forgetting or leaving aside is as much a part of this 
moment as resuming, as starting afresh, as gathering up 
into new sense. There is a resonant silence when a story 
breaks mid-sentence … and then, another story begins. 
We are not sure if it is the continuation of the previous 

















188 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
psychological objectivities are cultural artifacts, nonethe-
less, and crooked as they may be, they permit us to dis-
mantle the machine. Isn’t this rather naïve? What you call 
dismantling is another artifact from the same tool chest, 
and the degree to which these yield to one another is 
already delimited. We may imagine other tool chests and 
other forms of penetration, but the fact remains that all 
awareness of the machinations of inner reality goads us to 
this task. 
All 
DAVID ODELL 189 
with effort at the gymnasium, I become divided into two 
parties: the one that is determined to continue and the one 
that begs for a stop. Each of these is a possible point of 
identification, but in the moment I cannot entirely identify 
with either. For the most part, I am the former. This is the 
one that then becomes implicit; it commands from a 
bridge in the mind while the other keeps trying to break in 
from the side of the body. It is as if they are vying for the 
allegiance of the one who actually executes the actions that 
constitute the lived moments; the identification for this 
one takes places in an ongoing way. It is as if the “I” can 
only know itself through this process called identifi-
cation—the reflexive accedence to one of the parties—and 
this knowing is not merely cognitive but practical; it 
determines its active choices. The reflexive choice cannot 
settle conclusively for either side since it requires a unity 
of meaning and feeling, and these are divided between the 
two. Again, the oddity of this process may be just a 
reflection of the neurological incompatibility of the two 
dispositional systems. 
Working 
190 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
weariness at the end of a day in which consciousness is just 
a skeleton force—the wakeful reference to an “I” is dis-
continuous; the focalisation that is its special attribute is 
wandering and indifferent. Because it requires such delib-
erate maintenance, it is a zero degree of waking con-
sciousness and should therefore be more revealing of its 
essence than the mind of noon. But this consciousness 
merged with feeling is contemptuous of words. The realm 
of interest opened here as writing seems to be panoptic, 
but it is virtually blind to the current of life which sustains 
it and which it worships. 
This 
DAVID ODELL 191 
and emotion (like commitment and ease, or reflection and 
suffering) are not opposites, but dialectically related part-
ies in the sense that they appear as reciprocal identi-
fications. As such, they remain out of reach—each one 
blocked by its partner—and hence function as the van-
ishing points that define the more or less perspectival 
space of (human) experience. Wisdom is to learn their 
synthesis, which is no longer played in such a dialectical 
space. The terms are then realised as finite—infinitely 
fragile, but attainable. This finite is the particular fully 
exposed in its mortality. We live once. We have to choose. 
There is no system. 
Love 
192 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
the songs and stories that we hear or that we tell ourselves, 
emotion is so often evoked by love prevented that it almost 
seems to be identified with it. If self-love were to be in-
cluded with love, it might be possible to argue that all 
emotions arise in this way; however, in the recurrent 
narrative mythos, love is very precisely defined as an 
opening towards the other, which may be narrow or 
broad, deep or shallow, depending on the context. How-
ever, the essential association with emotion that is added 
to love in these forms threatens the very possibility of such 
an opening. Love is a turning of the will, while emotions 
are a movement of feeling. It is only when the two are 
grasped as entirely separate that we may contemplate their 
synthesis. In Christianity, an entire faith is based on a 
narrative that confuses love and emotion.	  This may be the 
key to its greatness, but it also explains why the history of 
Christian love is such a chequered one. 
In 
DAVID ODELL 193 
some fields of mathematics we actually encounter the phe-
nomenon of an expansion of context in which a 
previously infinite term becomes finite. This could be a 
model of the spiritual and psychological phenomenon 
called transcen-dence, but it may show only that 
mathematics is in thrall to the same illusion. Looking in 
the world for concrete examples of this paradigm, we find 
that it is either so ubiq-uitous as to be banal or so rare as 
to be effectively non-existent. 
In 
194 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
strong character is one that remains consistent in focus 
and direction in spite of the various reflections of it that 
are ascribed to others. This character seems to pre-exist its 
dealings with the world and to be founded on a base of 
knowledge. The weak character is one whose form is 
continually renegotiated through ideas of the world and 
which so lacks the constancy of anything to be known. The 
latter may, however, be more self-conscious than the 
former, and in this way constitute a deeper, if unreliable, 
point of knowledge, which is an ironic knowing of itself 
and the world. This is a thoroughly Hegelian antithesis (cf. 
his discussion of Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew) but it func-
tions as much on an intra- as inter-psychic level. We can 
find ourselves living it on a day-to-day or even hour-to-
hour basis. Like a buoyant doll, the “I” always bobs up-
right in any sea. (See also the character played by George 
Clooney in the Coen Brothers’ film O Brother, Where Art 
Thou?) 
The 
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moment of waking consciousness emerges from latent 
body awareness. In fact, it never leaves body awareness, 
but if it has any sort of career before mysteriously being 
superceded, it sculpts this plastic inner sense of materially 
being here into the appearance of those luminous and self-
determined forms we call thoughts. When I am ill, it is as 
if the body remains asleep in all of this, and so my 
wakefulness is also moulded out of sleep. It is hard to 
believe that this is not just an exaggeration of the usual 
state of affairs: the flesh being almost always, almost every-
where enfolded in sleep. 
Each 
196 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
sleepiness of the body is because the senses which 
constitute the life of the body do not themselves 
distinguish inside from outside. The body’s intrinsic 
picture of the world is of a space defined by the evanescent 
saliencies of an indefinite mass of sensation, indefinitely 
merged with its own flickering movements and shadows of 
movement. (Possibility is, before anything else, a 
kinesthetic category.) This may often seem a sort of grey 
paisley world (and quite poor in comparison to the one 
called into wakeful definition by the imperious outside), 
but it knows many more dimensions of motion; in sur-
rendering to it, we pass into dreaming—a state in which 
unlimited freedom is ironically countered by an almost 
total absence of control. 
The 
DAVID ODELL 197 
is possible to imagine an unending dream, but difficult to 
believe that an unending waking state could have any 
consistency. The diurnal cycle is not only a habitual con-
sideration of waking mind (at least in its caretaker role), 
but seems to be intrinsic to the constitution of all psychic 
objectivities. The self is already that which expends itself 
so that it may renew itself, and even the perception of 
colour requires a screen that is continually melted down 
and started anew. The things that belong most thoroughly 
to the waking world have in them a sort of strain, as if they 
are pushed into unequivocal manifestation by a force that 
perishes in its very extension. In this sphere, everything is 
known through the body, unlike dream, where the know-
ing is entirely in body. 
It 
198 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
am suddenly roused from a thick afternoon sleep and a 
split second later am aware that the phone is ringing. This 
tiny delay represents the time taken for the screen of 
reality to knit itself together, the response to the ringing 
phone presumably following more immediate pathways as 
a result of a lifetime of conditioning. For the rest of the 
evening, I am aware of the floating, constructed quality of 
the world. (It is no wonder that the ringing phone was 
used to just this effect in The Matrix). Again, on another 
occasion, I am dreaming I am in a room with loud music 
playing when the alarm wakes me up. I am aware of the 
alarm but I can also “hear” the music stop playing, as if 
someone switched off the sound a moment after the scene 
blanked out. 
I 
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utterances are more or less successful at bringing this 
occasion to the surprising speakability of its origination—
this occasion: as much that of this reading as this writing, 
although it seems as if a writer must formally present the 
shifter “this” to the reader. Consider it done. Being alive, 
being awake, are successive frames for this knowingness, 
which is the lighting of a multiply determined corner of a 
world. The perspectives implicit in these determinations 
belong, by definition, to a further inward transparency, 
but the constraints of the knowing (which are the para-
meters and ontologies of the world) can in no way reach 
there. Experience of the world and of the self apprises us of 
an extraordinary inconstancy, as if to gradually accustom 
us to thinner air, thinner objects, and surrender of the 
biographical knower. The events themselves draw towards 
a fuller satisfaction. 
These 
200 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
deep sleep, from dream, from immersion in the privacy of 
that syntax of afferent and efferent sensitivity known as 
the body, we emerge into this common space, this “clear-
ing” where we meet and lose ourselves again in the end-
lessly interwoven threads of our lives. Mundane, quo-
tidian, these words belie the miraculous consistency of this 
reality, so regretted by the dead Achilles when he is 
summoned by Odysseus. The medium of this knowing is 
revealed, in essence, when it is just turned within itself. 
This is the fluidity of dream and the flowing reabsorptions 
of sleep, and yet, rising to the surface, it becomes a world 
of recurrent mutual objects whose very changes are subject 
to strict laws of conservation. Whether this all reflects the 
odyssey of a point subject or whether subjective effects 
result from the activation of phases of an immobile reality, 
the possibility of an awareness oblique to the diurnal 
round is breathed like oxygen and turns all jadedness to 
wonder. 
From 
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moment is supremely open, that is its nature far prior to 
what we imagine could be brought out by any cultivation. 
This openness is, paradoxically, utterly private because it is 
intimate, with an intimacy that is the other face of its 
nature. It is not that the intimacy belongs to a subject; the 
subject is an hypothesis brought in as if to ground this 
intimacy, which otherwise seems to turn away even from 
itself. That Being simultaneously reveals and conceals is to 
be understood this way, and these indications of it which 
attempt to bring together primal openness with human 
spaces are themselves the openness of this indelibly mixed 
space. 
Every 
202 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
are forms of sentience far subtler than consciousness, and 
which form the underlying field out of which it arises, like 
a flame playing over coals or a pattern of ionised gases in 
an electric field—more subtle forms of feeling with no 
clear boundaries, so that the momentary answer to the 
question “How are you?” is like the solution to an equa-
tion. (That is, a kind of trope which is neither metaphor 
nor metonymy, but which we know.) 
There 
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can we even put this forward when it is only consciousness 
which provides the “there is” in which to situate the very 
possibility of such a field? Because we are beings who 
know sleep and falling asleep, when consciousness flickers 
out while feeling remains continuous, although undergo-
ing an involution. 
How 
204 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
is separable from body, but not feeling. Even when feeling 
is transferred through music or song, it is always inclusive 
of a body sense with which it is not necessarily identified. 
The inclusion may be a function of the very impossibility 
of identification, as when the body sense is indefinitely 
plural. Thought as distinct from feeling is an abstraction, a 
passing to the limit, but this is just what thought is: ab-
straction, limit, infinite, functional. At other times, how-
ever, I have noted that some works of Bach seemed as if 
they could be enjoyed by beings with no bodily sense, as if 
there were purely intellectual or spiritual emotions. 
Thought 
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reference of feeling to an outer world seems to have a 
tension in it—outer world being counterposed to body-in-
feeling—so that consciousness is work in some thermo-
dynamic sense. I’m really asking why it is we need to sleep, 
why this need is pre-understood in waking consciousness. 
A state of supreme lucidity, where thought flows effort-
lessly, united with lively feeling, is one that we know to be 
transient—a subtle strain on the organism. The waking 
state that seems closest to indefinite extensibility is that of 
insomnia, which is one of fitful and incoherent feeling. 
Significantly, the closest we often come to the former state 
is in certain kinds of lucid dreaming or in creative bursts, 
when the pressure of the outer world, its gravity, is sus-
pended. 
The 
206 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
moment of consciousness can never be found; it is lived 
here and now, patently, and yet when we look for it, it is 
gone (so that it is always consistent to deny qualia). It 
comes to flower only in a gaze that looks through it. Con-
sciousness, then, is the tenor, and feeling the vehicle, but 
we never intend feeling as such. Since feelings are not 
separable, to speak of them is to make distinctions in an 
ever-changing field, one that is multi-dimensional or a-
dimensional. We know them, but we cannot speak them as 
they are known. 
A 
DAVID ODELL 207 
feelings predispose a distinction of inner and outer, of 
within-the-body and out-in-the-world? Perception makes 
this distinction, although I would suggest nowhere more 
clearly than in the distinction between a dreamed space 
and the world in which we find ourselves awake. On the 
other hand, there seems to be no feeling that cannot be 
deepened and extended by acts that have the body as their 
sole locus. In the feeling of something “external”, there is 
an intimacy with a counterpart that is known as other 
body regarding body. Aesthesis as inner feeling gives rise 
to aesthetic perception—an intimacy with “externally” 
stabilised qualia. 
Do 
208 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
might say that the distinction between feeling and per-
ception is based on the fact that perception is merely 
qualitative and provisional of data relative to pre-given 
contexts, whereas feeling touches the thisness, the haec-
ceitas of things, and is inseparable from its character as act, 
inclusive of subjective and objective poles. The distinction 
between content and act is somewhat off target, however, 
since what I am calling feeling is still qualitative. It is a 
matter of kinds of qualities, or of the kinds of attention 
that reveal it: the sense of being brushed by things, elicited, 
or that our inner elaborations of the experience are, so to 
speak, dialogic. We await the spontaneity of things. Open-
ness is a comportment of (the act of) feeling, not of think-
ing or perception. 
We 
	  

















are two different mysteries in what David Chalmers calls 
the “hard problem of consciousness”—that is, the explan-
andum which remains after we bracket away all definable 
cognitive functionings. One of these is the qualia, the very 
feelings of what it is like to experience the world—any 
world. This problem is addressed by a two-aspect theory of 
reality where there is an objective outside and a subjective 
inside to things; it is amenable to a sort of “separate but 
equal” metaphysical apartheid. Any cognitively significant 
event is both causal (de facto) and specifiable in functional 
terms (de jure), and therefore the inwardness of things has 
no irreducible causal efficacy. The other mystery, however, 
is that it is the being aware of a world which makes a 
world; irreducibly, for me, the world arises within my 
knowing of it. This problem, which is difficult to state 
clearly, is what is addressed in those Quantum-based 
theories that attempt to connect consciousness with col-
lapse of the wave function. Whatever the virtues of such 
speculations, they do address the conviction that con-
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can imagine a qualia-giving consciousness that is still not 
quite a world-giving or ontological consciousness. This is 
why the nature of dream is so interesting. It is hard to 
imagine an ontological consciousness that is without qual-
ia, although there is no quality per se of being. None-
theless, the two seem inseparable, as in the following 
observations of Whitehead: “In awareness actuality, as a 
process in fact, is integrated with the potentialities which 
illustrate either what it is and might not be, or what it is 
not and might be. In other words, there is no con-
sciousness without reference to definiteness, affirmation, 
and negation. … Consciousness is how we feel the affir-
mation-negation contrast.” 
We 
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a dreamer’s consciousness be enough to “collapse the wave 
function”? It would seem not, since the dreaming form of 
awareness can register a situation without cancelling all 
the other possibilities. How about an animal’s? Could 
Schrödinger’s cat witness its own state of health? What 
about a human in a similar apparatus? In the absence of 
external evidence, can we witness the event of our own 
death? There is enough plausibility to the doubt to moti-
vate the plot of a movie like The Sixth Sense. 
Would 
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ease with which we suspend disbelief for The Sixth Sense 
has nothing to do with intuitions about death. In this case, 
death is an allegory of art which, in representing beings in 
all their pathos, consigns them, and us, to a strange inter-
realm—a life-in-death and death-in-life. This is, of course, 
all the more salient in cinema where we routinely view the 
preserved performances of dead actors. It is not possible, 
however, to separate the imaginary of art from all the 
other dimensions—social, linguistic, and ideal—that nece-
ssarily comport an imaginary dimension and which con-
stitute us as human. 
The 
	  

















be here as us, we represent ourselves to ourselves, whoever 
we be. This is functionality and feedback, and is true even 
of artificially intelligent systems. Such a structure cannot 
answer the question “Am I alive or dead?” since it can only 
interrogate an image of itself, and an image, by definition, 
is blind to this distinction. So again, is consciousness the 
bearer of an ontological dimension beyond functionality? 
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goes a very long way, as we are discovering all the time. 
Functionality plus embodiment goes even further and may 
even exhaust the ontological dimension of consciousness. 
Embodiment supplies specificity beyond specification. We 
know being in this way, and this is a being that has noth-
ing to do with Platonism or other onto-theologies (altho-
ugh these arise from the mythologisation of this strange 
kind of knowing). 
Functionality 
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am listening to a recital of a Beethoven piano sonata by 
way of a recording that was made 50 years ago by a 
now-dead pianist. My attention is mostly absorbed 
in the occasion of the performance, in which the 
pianist’s sub-jective realization of the work is conveyed 
to me through endless subtleties of phrasing. More 
than this, it is the myriad decisions expressed in each 
moment of the per-formance, the very life of the 
performer embodied as irreversible cuts in the wax 
master, that I respond to, and through them perhaps 
also to the decisions of the com-poser. To realize all of 
this I must listen with my whole body so that it can 
lend its life, its irreversible passing, to these inscriptions. 
The medium of the recording flatly contradicts this 
quality of once and once only, yet faith-fully conveys it, 
but only to the degree that we can hear it. 
I 
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is unimaginable. (This is why all pornography misses the 
point.) 
Embodiment 
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term “embodiment” traverses a number of contextual 
spheres, since it is a commonplace that the body is cul-
turally relative. The larger contexts are where we are infi-
nite and quasi-immortal, the narrower ones are where we 
are finite but still quasi-immortal, and only in the narrow-
est are we both finite and mortal. Of course, death too is 
culturally relative, but not my death. 
The 
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is unimaginable. (This is why nothing we can know or 
remember or hope for can approach the reality of death.) 
Embodiment 
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philosophers employ a thought experiment like this to 
show that our consciousness is not limited to this one 
organic framework: Imagine that slowly, and carefully, 
and piece by piece, the neuronal circuitry of the brain was 
replaced by functionally exact equivalent silicon circuits. 
There would be no point where you would be able to 
report a change, and yet beyond some point in the process, 
your consciousness would be realized by a quite different 
physical substructure. A very similar thought experiment 
could be employed to show the duplication of a con-
sciousness, and yet subjectively this is absurd. There is no 
functional equivalent for the this-and-here that belongs to 
the body in its paradoxical unsubstitutability. 
Some 
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wonder whether this is all a dream is not to look for 
evidence that reality has a dream-like nature, but simply to 
wonder whether it may not be revealed to be, in truth, 
quite different from how it has been taken to be. Evidence 
of how different in texture reality is from dream are of no 
avail precisely since we can imagine dreaming just such 
evidence and the conviction arising from it. To ask this 
question is to see how little we have to go on. 
To 
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is hard to imagine an animal with eyes that focus and that 
engages in complex and playful behaviour—such as a dog, 
a cat, or an octopus—that does not have a subjectivity, that 
does not experience qualia, or of which it is meaningless to 
ask, “What is it like to be this creature?” On the other 
hand, it is hard to imagine a robot or AI system that does 
have subjectivity, etc. Is this just a fact about imagination, 
or does it have something to do with the fact that in one 
case the consciousness is unsubstitutable while in the 
other it is not? 
It 
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of these questions reduce to this: Is consciousness a kind 
of thing in the world? This, in turn, reduces to the ques-
tion of how we constitute an actual world for interro-
gation. And so on, around the circle again. 
Many 
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is an ethical category; indeed, the presence of subjectivity 
seems to be presupposed in all ethical concepts, such as 
freedom, guilt, responsibility, reward, and punishment. 
Even ethical substitution, as in amends and the vari-
ous ideas of transferred guilt or merit, is only mean-
ingful in relation to a prior unsubstitutability. 
Unsubstitutability 
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is a congeries of ideas tacitly premised here on what, in 
another realm of inquiry altogether, is called conscious-
ness. Even utilitarianism, seemingly the most non-meta-
physical of ethical systems, equates the ethical substance 
with the capacity for feeling. Or, at least, for feeling 
happiness or unhappiness, which may be a further refine-
ment of mere feeling. 
There 
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is almost impossible to imagine an ethical agent or object 
that is wholly lacking in the (potential) feeling of being 
itself. An apparent exception is the comatose patient who 
is given no hope of recovery. A utilitarian has no qualms 
about terminating life support in such a case, while a 
religious person may forbid it. The prohibition may be 
grounded in indirect ways on the possibility, in principle 
or in hope, of the patient’s recovery, but it may also be a 
direct consequence of revealed law, “Thou shalt not kill.” 
It 
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law addresses us in our ultimate subjectivity, which is also 
our deepest freedom. Where a religious system is hostile to 
the concept of free will, something else serves for subject-
ification. It may be God’s sovereign freedom (and our 
capacity to suffer or rejoice) as in Calvinism, or it may be 
our ultimate equation with the divine as in the Atman is 
Brahman of Vedanta. 
Divine 
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and religion may help to define the terrain of this inquiry. 
They are monuments off to one side or the other while this 
pursues the narrow path straight ahead. 
Ethics 
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intuition that consciousness is freedom is reflected in 
another register in the “global workspace” theories, which 
locate consciousness in some central area of the cognitive 
mechanism having equal access to the results of all special 
processes. Here, what is essential is that the subject can 
hover over several alternatives before making a choice. 
Practically, freedom entails responsibility, which again 
entails judgement, and so we imagine the mechanism that 
enables it on the model of a courtroom. Or is the ubiquity 
of the court or deliberative council an embodied form of 
artificial intelligence? 
The 
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qualia, free will, etc. belong to a class of 
interrelated concepts which all have the property that, 
in searching them out, we only find reflections and 
allegories of our own seeking. This observation points 
to a topology, and hence to a kind of logic, that could 
provide a functional explanation for the persistence of 
these very questions; a logic of self-reflection can evade 
the paradoxes of self-reference, but remains madden-
ingly too simple for the philosophical imagination to 
grasp, and thence to find rest in. None of this lessens the 
mystery at any rate, at least for those who see the 
circularity in the very need to explain. 
Consciousness,
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could say that the problem of consciousness marks the 
limit of explanation, but this is not quite right since an 
explanation of limit could still be called for. It is better to 
say that it is a switch point in the path of inquiry where it 
is possible to leave explanation altogether. A change of 
gauge: no longer any such thing, but this thing. 
One 
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is to spread out in a planar fashion, but this is exactly what 
is impossible when we are to include both the thing and 
the condition of possibility of the thing, object and subject, 
content and context. There is a topology in play but it 
resists us, not just because it exceeds our (physical) imag-
ination—like a Klein bottle—but because we are ourselves 
inseparable from it. Nevertheless, a tremendous amount of 
ingenuity has gone into answering to this condition with 
some kind of interpretational act in which it is never 
enough just to invoke an impossible term; there must also 
be a doubling back of it onto the present act, a mise-
en-abîme (to recall a once fashionable term). This move 
is a contemporary version of the cogito—a direct and 
momen-tary pointing to the untraceable this. 
Explanation 
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are no positive data of consciousness. To be aware of is 
always to be aware of being aware of, and there is no clear 
distinction between these layers. Even before it is per-
ception, say, a consciousness is in meaning and, as such, is 
multiply determined. The phenomenologists, hoping to 
light upon a term for the most primitive move of con-
sciousness, chose intention: a loaded and ambiguous word 
which pre-empted their turn to an interpretative and 
essentially poetic discourse. 
There 
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is not purely scepticism that leads me to deny meaning to 
consciousness, that would be to dwell on the indeter-
minacy of the distinction between dreaming and waking. 
It is rather, and here I can only gesture vaguely, the ex-
treme disjunction between the present moment and the 
immediate past. Meaning, or a datum, is the past and is 
dependent on this: unknowable. (That which is cannot 
even be called Present except by way of the Past). 
It 
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the function of negation there appears to be at least a 
momentary affinity with reality. This divine discontent 
that wrenches itself free from any resting place, even from 
itself, may be motivated by a prior intuition of the real. But 
even without that, in its very movement it is in alignment 
as unknowing with the unknown. To assert this is, of 
course, to immediately betray it; it needs to be negated 
again, and the solution to this double negative is by no 
means obvious, although many have taken it to be irony. 
In 
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does irony fail? If it were a matter of falling short in some 
way then irony would succeed after all, in an ironic way. 
The answer is in that “after all.” Irony is negation and neg-
ation of negation, but only after the fact. It does not derive 
from the negation that is presence, but from the negation 
of presence that enables position, from the flow of time. 
The archetype of irony is the contemplation of a past 
moment, or better, one past’s “take” on another past as 
past. 
Why 
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us assume a Husserlian analysis of the present moment 
into noesis, noema, and noematic horizon. And let us 
further grant that these three terms are so inextricable and 
interdependent that we cannot draw the distinction of 
subject/object across them in any way; noesis is fused with 
noema, whose horizon is its enabling and material con-
dition. Each of the three terms is prior to or subject of the 
others. Let us further say that, within this structure, the 
temporalisation takes place by way of the sequential 
relations of protentions and retentions, which are essential 
substructures of noematic horizon. This model seems able 
to elucidate to some degree the mystery of musical per-
ception, or, more generally, of any durational topology. 
Why does it need to be so complex? Because it must strive 
to exclude the self-contradictory and belated idea of the 
flow of time. 
Let 
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do I mean by saying that each of noesis, noema, and 
noematic horizon is subject of the others—that is, stands 
in the relation of subject to the others as objects? Because 
the subject is always and with equal justice, pure (grasp-
ing) act, pure revelation of content, and pure latent and 
unchanging precondition for any act or event whatsoever. 
What 
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flow of time is necessarily belated, since it only refers to 
pasts. Present is not in the flow, but the flow itself is in the 
present. 
The 
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do we say “always” for constancy across duration, why not 
“all-whiles”? We implicitly admit that the flow of time is 
an accomplishment, the result of a certain method, or, 
better, of methods differently suited to whatever is cur-
rent. The content of past and future is not being which is 
covered or uncovered by the flow of time, but it is made 
strategically in the fecund relation of content (noema) and 
horizon. There are ways to all of it. 
Why 
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am trying to expose the implicit assumptions that give the 
world the taken-for-granted quality that it has. To expose 
is to doubt, all the more so because the intellect is con-
temptuous of what it understands. So I create a structure 
of doubt where there was putatively a structure of will and 
of “bad faith.” If I am clever and do this well, there is a 
bracing and enlivening quality to it, but this structure of 
doubt is in its own way just as presumptive and artificial as 
what it exposed. In any case, there remains a feeling that it 
doesn’t all quite add up yet, that infinite tasks remain to be 
done, that the “undoing” has just begun. In the way of 
structures defined by their relation to a vanishing point 
(which is indeterminately internal or external), nothing 
has changed at all. This is known as seeking. 
I 
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ask you for something and you refuse, derailing my 
expectation. This causes pain, and so I tell myself that I 
shall never ask you for any such thing again. I forget the 
pain, but my disposition towards you has changed. Later 
on, you let me know that you would now grant the same 
request, but I don’t ask you again. Later still, I accuse you 
of always denying me this thing, and you retort that I 
never ask. In other words, the expectation continues but 
the expression of it and the aware-ness of it are inhibited. 
This is a miniature paradigm of the psychological self in 
which we can see that the same phenomenon may be 
theorised in terms of the unconscious, or of temporal 
horizons, or of social scripts, or of ethics, or language, and 
doubtless more besides. 
I 
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and expression can name two of the many cognitive 
subsystems which together constitute a “self-conscious 
life-form.” (We project mechanisms like this onto animals 
as well, especially our pets, to just the degree that we imag-
ine them to be self-conscious.) Taken as within a subject, 
each of these subsystems is in Time in its own way; if there 
is a lack of correspondence, of mapping, between different 
temporalisations, then we have all the phenomena that 
psychoanalysis ascribes to the unconscious. 
Expectation 
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great theoretical antithesis used to be between struct-
uralism and phenomenology, which, in turn, was the suc-
cessor to body and mind oppositions. Psychoanalysis, cog-
nitive science, and various theorisations of embodied and 
computational mind locate themselves in the interspace of 
these polarities. What all of these point to is that con-
sciousness is no longer consciousness (it is never self-
presence), and structure is no longer structure (it is never 
pre-given out of purely material considerations, but is as if 
teleologically determined by possibilities of knowing). 
The 
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is not self-presence; so we try to think of it as other-
presence in a scheme where an implied infinite  (or 
indefinite) regression takes the place of self-adequation. 
Thus, “the subject is a signifier which represents the 
subject for another signifier” or “to be is to be the value of 
a variable.” Other-presence is, however, just an antithe-
sis to self-presence, or perhaps even just a mathemat-
ical transformation of it. What if it was clearly seen that 
the question of self-presence could never even arise? 
Similarly, the question of the simple being-here of 
“experience” could not arise, since it has no negation. 
Consciousness 
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vs. Dasein. To be is not to be here. The latter expresses an 
implicit attempt to interpret being motivated in part by 
awareness of death. When one of us dies, he is no longer 
here; when I die, here will continue, but without me. But 
was there a here lacking me before I was born—is this 
what we study in history? No. The most we can say is that 
here is some of the flavour of being. We cannot speak, as 
many do, of death as “leaving the body,” although it is 
clear when we look at the corpse of someone we have 
known that he or she is no longer here. This object no 
longer gives here-ness, and neither does it point to a there. 
Sein 
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contemplated with its ineffable and inexorable gentleness, 
defamiliarises desire. We see how far we have strayed, how 
many layers of holding-on we have set within us, how it all 
must be traversed again in the opposite direction. What 
was it you wanted? This is an invitation to a relentless his-
torical regression. 
Death, 
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constructs this as (a) life, and, hence, opens the possibility 
of history as truth, finding the origins of illusion, of sin, or 
of psychological or spiritual scission, whether under the 
banner of Freud or Proust or whomever. 
Death 
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seem to shed skins frequently; or, better, we seem to act a 
succession of diverse roles in the slowly evolving costume 
of the body on the (usually) even more slowly evolving 
stage of the world. Seeing someone with the already nat-
ural gestures and language of a new station in life, it seems 
they have outlived their former self, but to us they carry 
their dead somewhere about them. 
We 
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the scenery from a moving train are the various articulated 
dimensions of personal history, running off. The slow 
moving mountains in the distance may be the body or 
society … but here already the metaphor breaks down, 
since sometimes body and society are the most rapidly 
changing frames of all. The distant stars, the observer in 
the carriage—all are moving within themselves like the 
slow seething of clouds. 
Like 
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is not a positive way that is sought, however, but with 
infinite deference, the practice of a subject that is, in the 
most local sense, the differential between knowing and 
realising heteronomy. This on the one hand; on the other, 
an open secret, a heterognosis, a realisation of anterior 
freedom without a subject. 
It 
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questions about the self founder on the limit expressed by 
the saying: there is no thing like what I am. This is as 
much as to say that what I am is not thing-like, and not a 
lesser being either, since, in as accurate a phrasing as 
possible, Am gives Being. Yet, the Am is ghost-like in a 
world of things. In some psychologies, the subject strives 
for the solidity and monumentality of a thing, and labours 
against its essential negation, but perhaps the nature of 
“thing” is constituted by us just for this antithesis, and so it 
can speak to us of ourselves. The way that things inhabit 
time and space is an endless meditation for art. 
Many 
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history of a thing—a stone, a shirt, a song, an old tin can, 
or an axe that has had two new heads and four new 
handles. There is an endless catalogue of things and of 
modes of things, material or immaterial, originals and 
copies, dreamed and not-dreamed. The res, the matter, the 
real thing … “Here’s the thing.” How naïve of moralists 
like Buber to distinguish a relation to “thou” from a 
relation to “it,” as if the latter were somehow one-dimen-
sional. The thing looks back at you (at least the not-
dreamed thing does) and it tells you where you are, what 
sphere. Try getting a “thou” to do that! 
The 
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an other is like knowing in a dream—the object is in-
constant and indeterminately compounded of one’s own 
projections; it challenges, irritates, and evades so that the 
centre of gravity of subjectivity seesaws back and forth bet-
ween the poles. Am I reading her, or is she reading me? 
Which of us holds the other hostage? 
Knowing 
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qu’être. A thing cannot call me to account the way another 
person can, with their gaze, their attention, their listening, 
their silence. Animals … well they are somewhere inbe-
tween: dogs are easily fooled, whereas cows seem to peer 
straight into my carnivorous soul. 
Autrement 
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“otherwise than being” the same as loving someone so 
much that you would die for them? I would give up my 
being for their being; this is something that is felt directly 
in passion, but it is not always so loving. There are num-
erous ways that humans love or worship certain objects or 
objectives unto death—a child, a nation, a god. This can be 
an immoral idolatry of the being of that object: that it or 
he may prevail. Death is an inseparable part of the imag-
inary of love, but isn’t that, too, just an imaginary death, 
even if it passes to the act? The other-of-being folded up 
and waiting within being—that is hardly a surprise since 
we know what gives being. 
Is 
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cannot be the basis of ethics, since it would be unethical to 
cleave to the good only as one loved the good. Love implies 
a choice that is seated in the marrow, but the ethical re-
quires a choice beyond you, an Other’s choice. Of course, 
the ethical imperative may well be “(to) love,” but that is a 
different thing. Here, love would already be a test whose 
implicit, though unacted, penalty for failure would be 
death. All ethical imperatives marshal death, and in this 
way underwrite their law-like status. Even if the imper-
ative was “survive,” it would still, as an ethic, be directed to 
a principled survival, failing which, it would be better to 
die. 
Love 
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love of another, the intentional object is the ethical 
substance of the beloved, almost as if to say: I love her 
because she is good. What is it I am calling ethical sub-
stance?	   Broadly speaking, the continuity of our actions 
and the world, the field of predispositions we generate in 
our forward motion, and that by which we implicitly put 
ourselves up for judgement. To love is then to will to 
intervene in the judgement awaiting the beloved. But this 
will is also culpable; the ethical substance is also that of the 
other, touching which, we render ourselves answerable. 
In 
258 2: BODYING FORTH (2002) 
is not quite right, since there is also love which is a will 
towards the other as merely being. Being, however, is a 
concept with no shape, so the intention to it needs to get 
hold of the object by some active force, namely its will to 
persist in being, which is already ethical. 
This 
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see the beloved, momentarily, merely being, stationary as 
it were in her essence, is to apprehend her in the inadver-
tency of ethical substance, in something she shows (us) in 
spite of herself while her attention is on something else. 
This is a great fueler of love, but it cannot be its entirety—
at best: its ground, its drone, its bourdon. 
To 
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most potent inadvertency of substance is beauty in ano-
ther, and acknowledging this helps us to see how the 
object, or lure of desire, is created by ethical substance. A 
purely passive beauty doesn’t do it, but a beauty good, bad, 
proud, gracious, or indifferent does. The ethical substance 
provides the context for the crystallisation of the object of 
desire; it is almost a truism that the same woman (or man) 
excites us quite differently according to the context in 
which we come to know her (or him). The thing that we 
long to experience of the other and which drives us insane 
when we are jealous is the crisis of the will to the opening 
of themselves to us (or to him or her, the third person). 
The 
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beautiful object is neither disinterested nor does it seem 
inadvertent; it imposes itself on being, indifferent only to 
its creator or would-be possessor. This imposition is an 
analogue to ethical substance, hence the way that, to many 
people, the destruction of an artwork is a moral evil. 
The 
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what we are impose itself on being? It seems not, since we 
seek to do so by our engines or influences with such a 
failing success that we must always rebegin. We are not at 
home in being. If you touch the quick of us, we respond in 
too many modes, in all temporalities (punctual, duration-
al, fictive, real), in too many to ever be contained in a 
collection, hence the futility of attempts to equate us, in 
any sense, to consciousness. 
Does 
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ugly or kitsch object does not impose itself on being; it 
imposes itself on us as if we were (already) being and there 
were nothing more natural than to use us to get to being. 
This is a backhanded insult. 
The 
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I see another human being, I see them with my whole body 
in such a way that, on some subtle level, there is a con-
fusion of feeling and even of identity. Subliminally and 
spontaneously, my body reads and is read by their body, 
and a knowing is enacted in this way that is distinctive to 
personal relations. This may be mediated by the so-called 
mirror neurons, but phenomenologically it is more precise 
to say that where inanimate objects return my gaze, and 
hence locate me in metaphysical space, other sentient or 
personal beings absorb my gaze and so locate me in ethical 
space. 
When 
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view of the self as immersed in a world continuously re-
configured by an enactive monism, the father of which is 
perhaps Merleau-Ponty, is seductive but incomplete. On 
the one hand, the immediate and non-dual knowing which 
it places prior to discursive consciousness has no warrant 
and is in fact often magical, or simply wrong. This poses 
no practical problem, since we have learned to use it only 
as the first hypothesis in a quasi-scientific enquiry, ano-
ther of whose working premises must, of course, be radical 
separation and pluralism. On the other hand, it does not 
allow sufficient room for the symbolic, which, while en-
tirely embodied in its own way, does not rest on any form 
of analogy, as for example in our primordial apprehen-
sion of sexual difference. 
The 
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I seem to know the other, but may be completely wrong—
this possibility rests on a non-phenomenological void that 
opens an ethical space, and also a space of desire, but these 
are hardly to be distinguished. 
That 
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non-dual imaginary may be regarded as the ground of 
compassion, and, hence, as an ethical space, but at best 
this could only be in a limited sense since it lacks an 
objective difference on which to found decision. At any 
rate, it is more immediately productive of mimetic desire: 
the most violent and self-enclosed desiring relation to the 
other. 
The 
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late phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty carries a trem-
endous charge of revelation of the obvious, of what is 
more near than at hand, and it seems to resolve all conun-
drums of the subject and the object, etc.; this is not a 
philosophical revelation, but a poetical one. It unfolds 
what is latent in metaphor and in the deep joy at presence 
to a world; like Valéry’s swimmer in Le Cimetière Marin, it 
answers core doubts with the wisdom of the senses. 
The 
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am I me and not somebody else?” If there is any sense to 
this question, then shouldn’t it rather be, “Why am I me 
and not everybody else?” And is this the same as the medi-
tational question: “I = me”? 
“Why 
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and “me” are conventional designations with the peculiar 
logic of the shifter, in which they are part of a combinatory 
scheme with all the other pronouns. The moves that trans-
form between “I” and “me” in this scheme are probably 
sufficient to generate the entire set; the move from “I” to 
“me” presupposes an interlocutor, a “you,” and since the 
“you” is not anchored to the certainty of the “I” (or since 
you can say “I,” but it is not my “I”), the “you” implies 
plurality, and hence a “he” or “she,” etc. In the innermost 
consideration of “I = me”? “I” becomes interlocutor to 
itself—I view myself as if from the outside then ask myself 
what it is that I see. This is not quite as paradoxical as it 
sounds, since “I” designates both a term in the scheme and 
that for which the entire scheme is actual; it is as if the “I” 
is the player behind the mask of all identities as well as 
appearing as one of the identities (commonly known as 
“me”). 
“I” 
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moves in the linguistic scheme are indelibly phenomeno-
logical in that the choice of moves in a particular situation 
produces and is produced by the context, the under-
standing of that situation. I can regard you as you, or as 
he, or even as it, and I can regard myself as he or it on your 
behalf, or otherwise. 
The 
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always remains a possibility, since no matter how 
subtle and encompassing our thought becomes, there is 
always an “I” term in reference to which the posited 
objectivities appear. This term cannot be assimilated to 
the world of these objectivities without losing its nature 
as “I”-subject, yet everything points back to its actuality, 
and hence directs a further inquiry. 
Self- inquiry 
DAVID ODELL 273 
know, in a wholly pre-reflective way, a mutual coor-
dination between subject and object. This accounts for the 
plausibility of Lacan’s narrative of the mirror stage and 
also of all aesthetico-philosophical phenomenological mon- 
isms. Indeed, insofar as it too is plausible, it provides a 
better motivation for the indelibly phenomenological com-
ponent of the pronomial group operations mentioned above. 
Closer consideration, however, reveals that this mutual 
coordination is, in fact, an inverse relation. The more 
weight is given to subject, the less to object, etc., but 
neither can be made to solely predominate in this way, as 
the cost of annihilating the other would be infinite. It is as 
if a constant is maintained in the mathematical product of 
subject and object, s*o = k. The constant k is, of course, 
not an absolute but a relative constant, and so we might 
call it a function of reality, f(R). Thus, there is never an 
irruption of the subject (as in one interpretation of the 
mirror stage), but an irruption of reality. 
We 
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can play with this derived equation s*o = f(R) in some 
interesting ways. First, we can combine it with the every-
day sense of identity as expressed in “I = me” or s = o = 
self. The original equation transforms to (self)2 = f(R), or 
self = √f(R). This could, for example, be seen as justifying 
the humanist axiom that “Reality is (only) experienced in 
human relations.” Such an interpretation, however, pre-
supposes an incommensurability between a term and its 
square root, but if our field is the reals (in other words, if a 
certain degree of reality is accorded to all terms), then 
what we have here is a description of the way in which 
reality determines the self. The last of the equations above 
should actually read self = +/- √f(R), reminding us that 
there are actually positive and negative valences at play. A 
term of positive valence is one that pushes back against 
another term with at least equal force: a negative valence is 
one that invites in the term that it meets with at least an 
equal yieldingness. Thus, a positive reality (waking life) 
gives rise to a positive or negative self of less certain 
valence than the reality itself, while a negative reality 
(dream life) gives rise to an imaginary self indeterminately 
negative or positive. (Mathematically, i and –i are perfectly 
symmetrical.) 
We 
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self-inquiry as a spiritual practice, the equation s = o is re-
placed by its categorical negation, and one pursues every 
objective manifestation of self in the light of this. The only 
possible result is o = null (zero, empty set), which im-
mediately implies that s = inf, so that our fundamental 
equation is now null*inf = f(R) (= finite reality). This 
seeming paradox is resolved mathematically by the theory 
of Non-Standard Analysis in which the null-term is actu-
ally a non-standard infinitesimal, and something analo-
gous may obtain in spiritual awakening, at least to the 
degree that the very knowledge that any system of under-
standing fails to fix reality becomes productive of a whole 
new understanding of understanding, and a deeper im-
mersion in reality itself. 
In 
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enormous number of consequences may be drawn from 
the formulation in the previous section, not least of which 
is that the fundamental equation is now equivalent to f(R) 
= null*inf, so that all functions of reality are of the form 
null*inf, and, hence, “the sense of separateness” (which is a 
concomitant of finiteness) is a mere appearance on a rela-
tion of infinities (which, if not one of utter sameness, is 
not one of difference either). (Definition of infinity: some-
thing that can be equal to a proper part of itself.) 
An 
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call the sense determined by s = o, and hence o  ≠	  null, the 
everyday sense of reality, and that determined by s ≠ o and 
o = null the awakened state. The s and o here refer to the
subjective and objective correlates of self, and so while the
former case is based on s = o, it is clear that this can never
be directly experienced; it is a belief, or more accurately a
lie, and one which must be sustained by tactics of deferral,
denial and mediation, from which all of the psychology of
the I-object can be derived. (In particular, its core anxiety.)
The tactics do not include a knowledge of what it is they
are defending against except as a sort of virtual point
(death) masked by the same defensive negations, but the
play of this virtual point in relation to the “life” of the I-
object gives rise to a major element in aesthetic experience.
We 
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is no move possible for the subject of the everyday sense of 
reality to the awakened subject. As long as some form of s 
= o prevails, even, say, in the form s = k*o for large k, the 
key understanding is lacking. Systematically increasing k 
forms the so-called positive way, which can doubtless pro-
duce some spectacular results but nonetheless remains 
subject to the former dispensation under which any move-
ment in s is also a movement in o. 
There 
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term f(R) as the relative constant—and hence finite func-
tion of reality—can also be interpreted as Limit or Law: 
that which necessarily determines the mutual relation of 
force and action, or intention and consequence, or of 
inner freedom and outer necessity, called fate. The concept 
of Law itself marks a junction point between subjective 
and objective realities. 
The 
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function of the mind is the practical anticipation of the 
world-lines of objective congeries—this is, as in the cur-
rent orthodoxy, what has most survival value. The belief 
that s = o means that there must be an I-object, and so it 
becomes a concern of the mind, or rather its world-line 
does. Experiences of bodily emotions such as fear, desire, 
arousal, anger, pleasure, etc., are taken as clues to the 
wholly contingent fate of this object, and so the I-object, 
which is never seen, is contingently identified with the 
practical reference point of these emotions. I never ident-
ify with anything; that would be a logical impossibility. 
Instead, a variable, o, in an ongoing project—anxious con-
cern for the fate of o—is conveniently identified with the 
object of another salient project—maintenance of bodily 
homeostasis, or surrender of homeostasis to pleasure, or 
the continuity of some objective abstraction, for example. 
The 
DAVID ODELL 281 
we place the proposition that there exists a self-object next 
to its negation—that no such object can exist—then it is 
clear that the latter is more true than the former. In a 
certain light, it abolishes it entirely, but the resulting state 
of certainty has no warrant to declare itself Truth absolute. 
Indeed, the being of such a creature may be ruled out by 
the same observation, since a possible knower being ab-
solutely correlative to the known would be another self-
object. Not truth, but reality—one is closer to reality, but 
only relatively so. 
If 
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gears of dialectic do not engage; we remain in neutral. 
The 
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attempt to state a true philosophy must take into account 
the competing claims of structurally exclusive perspectives 
such as subjective and objective, individual and relational, 
etc., but the moment it relies on a schematism to hold 
them in place, it forfeits its philosophical basis since it has 
lost sight of the only philosophical question that re-
mains—that is why and how are there such alternatives. 
The 
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think of different perspectives or realms as mutually in-
verse or conjugate views is one way to try to posit an 
underlying order to what seems an otherwise inexplicable 
diversity in being. It is a speculation directed at the most 
underlying law, but as it is also a perspective, it must 
belong essentially to one branch of the diversity that it 
seeks to compass; it can never deliver its ground to the 
thought which undertakes it, no matter how sincerely. The 
same limitation applies to every system of thought from 
Hegel onwards in its cunning ventures to include what it is 
forced to acknowledge as also un-thought. This is the same 
history in which philosophy begins to voice the demand to 
stop thinking. 
To 
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and object form a mutual inverse within my experience 
when it is reduced to the essentials of solipsism. This does 
not imply a belief in only the self however, since by the 
very fact of enunciation, solipsism is intentionally inverse 
to relationship with an other. This openness to another 
haunts the very silence of being as much as, but differently 
to, the incorrigible priority of consciousness. 
Subject 
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limits of thought are thinkable, but they remain the limits 
of thought. 
The 
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method is usually identified as the triadic dialectic, but in 
fact he plays this like a sort of cat’s cradle on the com-
binatorics of the subject/object relation—is the object out 
there or in here? Am I out there or in here, since there is 
nothing but here, and here is only what could ever be 
there, etc.? In this, as in many succeeding systems of the 
actual subject such as psychoanalysis, a structuralism is in 
counter-point to a phenomenology. In contrast to this, 
there is the aspiration towards a pure phenomenology 
such as Husserl’s. The value of the idea that justifies Chal-
mers’ “hard problem of consciousness”—that there is a 
something which is just what it feels like to be 
experiencing x (Hegel’s “sense certainty”)—is that it is 
equivalent to the non-triviality of pure phenomenology. 
Hegel’s 
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phenomenon: that something shines and reveals a true 
facet of itself in the knowing which is apt for it. The 
substance of the phenomenon is the very knowing of it, 
and yet it bespeaks nothing if not the independence of the 
known. There is enough constancy in what is known in the 
phenomenon that inquiry can pivot on it and defer to a 
related or constituent phenomenon a so-called subject, 
however, the original phenomenon was all of a piece, if it 
was anything at all. Thus, what seemed to be on the side of 
the subject of one phenomenon proves to be another 
phenomenon of equal status but differently situated, and 
looking back we can never say that it was actually present 
in the original complex. The phenomenon is plural, but it 
is so by way of indefinite plurality. 
The 
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the subject is a horizon-al phenomenon; logically, it is an 
impossible one. 
Experentially, 
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phenomenon is a way-station in the surrender of truth just 
before it disappears into the living stream of experience. 
Being true to myself, I acknowledge that it is just the posi-
tive feeling for life that maintains the sense of a spatial-
isation, a clearing, for the wonderful illusion of a truth to 
things themselves. The feeling for life, whatever its colour, 
is inseparable and dark and unreasonable. 
The 
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objective world is a subset of the subjective, and the 
subjective world is a subset of the objective. This is not a 
paradox; in mathematics, there is no logical problem with 
such a dual relationship, but insofar as one can be the cog-
niser of each of these conjoined propositions, one cannot 
be the simultaneous cogniser of both. Cunning theories 
can be proposed to overcome this, but they miss the point, 
which is just to see how the incompatibility points fleet-
ingly to what or who has invested in a world which makes 
such questions possible. 
The 
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great idols of life, those marvels in which I hoped or 
dreaded to find myself: fear and desire, art, intoxication, 
derangement, sex, rage, serenity, bliss, contemplation, 
worship, history and the rest, or love, in which I seem to 
find myself in spite of myself … In the sober afternoon 
light, they are all revealed as artifacts in the common 
landscape of humanity, passages rehearsed over and over, 
symbolic coral. This sober light has its own not inconsid-
erable attraction: Where “I” was, there It shall be. 
The 
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subjective verities fall under the rule of the will-to-believe. 
We discover them, but only as sustained by a subtle and 
mostly hidden effort at bringing them about and keeping 
them there. This is like forgery, except that there was not 
some prior reality that these take the place of. There was 
nothing there at all; we are the sole authors of what we 
need, and it is the reality of the need that is shaped in this 
way into viable ideals. The more we are aware of the power 
at work in this, the less real the underlying needs are seen 
to be. 
Most 
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is coextensive with significance”—this version of the prag-
matist’s creed may well be true, or even a tautology, 
without entailing that there is a complete correspond-
dence between structures of meaning and of significance. 
To view some area of meaning as textual is to see that it is 
based upon a play of material signifiers, but this does not 
imply that the relations of meaning within that field are 
guises for the relations of signifiers, or even that they are 
in some way reflections on the failure of such a corre-
spondence. In the end, what is at stake is the licence for 
interpretation, and the point is that semantics or semiotics 
cannot underwrite the extension of such a licence, but only 
make us doubt that there could ever have been bounds. 
“Meaning 
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gone, it’s gone!” So much so that I’m unable to say what it 
is that has gone. Weeks on end with no questions and no 
surprise. What do I know? Who is it that would be com-
pelled by the knowledge of death? What speaking position 
to open? It is good not to know, or to seem to know that it 
doesn’t matter who, or how, or in relation to what I sink 
into the moment as into a warm bath. 
“It’s 
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track, this desertification of the subject, is the furthest 
reach of only one kind of truth. It lies in a landscape al-
most entirely undiscovered, so that one thinks of cutting 
across to other places on the periphery when the empty 
sky becomes unbearable. 
This 
DAVID ODELL 297 
am a history and a climate reflecting that history and roil-
ing with its mismatches and soured appetites. I am a 
multitudinous overlapping community of partial selves, 
reactions, mirrors, mimicries, and masks realised in de-
mands and silences of the ever-changing moment. I am 
this fatigue, this vague nihilism of failed self-knowledge, 
this mildness, passivity, clouded curiosity, skeptical ab-
sence of a soul. I am what precedes the effort to say “I.” 
I 
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more pictures.” This is how Saul Bellow’s elderly narrator 
in Ravelstein responds when asked for his understanding 
of death. But where pictures have once been, there remains 
always the possibility of further pictures; the pictures are 
less real than the screen on which they appear. To put it 
another way, the ontological status of possibility is such 
that it cannot be swept away like phenomena. And hence, 
there is a rigorous separation between all phenomena and 
what can only be indicated with the words possibility or 
principle. Action or passion of the subject is this sepa-
ration. 
“No 
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white cinema screen is the pure possibility of all individual 
movies, but we cannot say that all movies—past, future, 
real, imagined, or unimagined—exist in some sense in the 
blank screen (although such a fantasy may be useful to an 
artist). It is rather that the screen—and the spectator—are 
unchanging realities that condition the unreality of the 
ever changing photoplay. The diegetic possibilities which 
make the meaning of the show are underwritten by the 
pure possibility inherent in what is always empty. Again, 
one can say that the movie was never really about the 
doings of the characters in it, but only about the life of the 
spectator, of which there has never been but one. 
The 
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cannot say there were no pictures before I was born, 
because there was no time, or there is no memory—two 
statements which are not exactly equivalent. At most, I can 
say that the phenomenological colour of having-been-
waiting forms no part of my earliest memories. Similarly, 
neither does the sense of a transition of the subject; rather, 
it seems as if the subject came about together with the 
crystallisation of the inner time sense. Is the subject like 
the character on the screen? No, because he carries within 
him his own source of illumination—a cogito that twists 
aside all forms of mapping. Is this like a battery, running 
on derived power, or is it a source in itself and hence 
identical with the one source by the strange logic that ob-
tains there? 
I 
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sketch out the subjective logic of an event, as I have been 
doing with “death,” is an exercise in the imaginary in the 
broadest sense of this term. To this, it could be answered 
that death is a collision with the real and so is beyond any 
categories of imagination or thought—except that I have 
just evoked a category, the real, for what is outside all 
categories. That the real enters into thought, in the form of 
death, of ultimate material exigency, can hardly be denied. 
It functions as a term for what is outside all the other 
terms, which may be phenomenologically or logically full; 
it casts a shadow over them because it must remain rad-
ically empty in these respects. Death prevents me from in-
voking any Parmenidean identity of thought and being, 
but it does so not as third term on a par with these, but as 
an infinitely gentle, infinitely devastating irony. 
To 
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discoveries beg to be shared even before they have been 
fully considered. They may be no more than pretexts for 
an imaginary sharing, which is itself a way to buy off the 
others, to misdirect them, so that I might return to the real 
inquiry which is solitary and shuns communication. 
Some 
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real inquiry, or the inquiry into the real, is a race with death, 
and so also a race towards death. One cannot say that it is of 
any interest, since the interesting is what arrests the flow of 
time, like an eddy, and creates a habitation for a picture of me 
within a picture, circling gently until it is swept away again. 
To meditate is to practise dying, or indeed to die as much as 
that can be an action, because it is to surrender everything 
that has been gained by interest. 
The 
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role is played in the constitution of experience as being 
that of a self-of-moment-in-affairs by the possession of 
deep time? This is the time of forgotten memories and 
intimations from childhood; it is what may be reawakened 
in epiphanies of the sensory world, what may suggest 
Archimedean regions beyond the flow of passing time to a 
Proustian sensibility. My vivid but infinitely distant sense 
of early childhood, and the conviction that it is the very 
same nameless Self questioning the dream now as then—
an identity so emphatic that now and then become of one 
nature—forms a quiet but vital part of all my personal 
memories. And yet, it seems more an artefact than a dat-
um—the very mechanism of memory seen in a certain 
angle of the light—because the content of the memories 
matters less than the way they are recalled. 
What 
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indelible scandal of sexual intercourse is only due in part 
to the series of taboos that must be broached in initiating 
the act. A detailed description of these could be quite leng-
thy, but the essence is perhaps the willing replacement of 
our highly developed sense of respect for the other in their 
personal integrity by a violence of desire that disintegrates 
them and us into a succession of a simultaneity of parts, 
both sensual and moral. And yet, on the other side of these 
transgressions, we re-emerge within a world that is un-
equivocally good. “Imparadised in one another” is a phrase 
that has often come to mind for this state, and it indicates 
as well the exclusivity that is the remainder of the scandal. 
The social sanction that various forms of coupling receive 
may be significant, but it is the phenomenological exclu-
sivity in the act itself that I am addressing. Two (or more) 
people engaged in making love have momentarily broken 
their social contract with the world; their bliss is uttered in 
a private language so that when it is over, even they will be 
unable to locate the referents. 
The 
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breaking of a heart is the most excruciating goad to trans-
cendence. The love that was ignited in a nucleus must 
awaken to its inherent disinterest if it is to survive in that 
shattering pain, because that is the only way it ever could 
have meant, even when it was exclusive. What happens to 
the scandal then? If anything, it becomes even more shame- 
ful. We avert our eyes from one made holy by suffering, as 
if everything excessive, everything exclusive, everything 
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